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There is ample statistical evidence that a significant number of
crimes are committed by persons who are to some extent under the
influence of alcohol. 2 Certainly intoxication is a frequently recurring issue in criminal cases, particularly in homicide crimes. What
legal effect evidence of intoxication should have is a question which
has been answered differently over time and among jurisdictions.
In Great Britain, and the United States generally, the defense of intoxication first achieved recognition about 1820. Its first appearance in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in 1794 was apparently somewhat precocious. The emergence of the defense in
Pennsylvania has roughly coincided with its efflorescence gener1. The writer wishes to thank Professor Arthur A. Murphy of the
Dickinson School of Law for the many hours he generously devoted to helping the writer sort out the complexities of the intoxication defense. Any
merit in the following article is due largely to Professor Murphy's ceaseless
effort to keep the writer on the right track. A few of the conclusions and
all of the errors are solely the responsibility of the author.
2. See, e.g., 2 WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 223 (1970).

ally, although in its details the defense has not developed uniformly anywhere.
A scholar in search of logic, consistency, and clarity of expression in the law would do well to look elsewhere than in the cases
involving intoxication as a defense. The grounds of the defense
have always suffered from a tendency to shift, almost imperceptibly, from case to case and from court to court, a tendency not generally recognized, or at least not explicitly acknowledged, by courts
or commentators. The present Pennsylvania law on the intoxication defense gives an appearance of simplicity and well-settled
resolution to the issues which belies the fact that behind the generalities lurks a host of old and unanswered questions. For example: How is evidence of intoxication being offered by the defendant-as tending to negative an element of the offense, or as an affirmative defense? If the latter, then what degree of intoxication
is required? How is it to be proved? How does the law measure
the physiological and psychological effects of alcohol in terms of
legal culpability? How does the intoxication defense compare to
the insanity defense? Does present law operate fairly in excluding
intoxication from the defenses to certain (general intent) crimes,
and in placing the burden of proof of intoxication upon the defendant?
The objectives of this paper are to illuminate the state of the
present law by a brief survey of the historical development of the
defense in Pennsylvania, to analyze the shifting bases and corollaries of the defense, to appraise both criticisms of the present law
and proposed changes, and finally, to suggest some modifications
and clarifications of present law. Information on the defense is
arranged in a more immediately practical fashion in the collection
of Pennsylvania cases and the model jury instructions found in the
appendices.
I.

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DEFENSE IN PENNSYLVANIA

Pre-nineteenth century law in Britain and the United States
apparently regarded evidence of intoxication, when it regarded it
at all, as an aggravation of crime, and not as a defense to asserted
criminal intent.3 Intoxication was viewed as a vice, if not as a
crime in itself, of which the accused could take no affirmative advantage. The opprobrium with which drunkenness was regarded
extended to attempts at pleading it defensively because, it was observed, intoxication often seems to "suggest" crime. The earliest
Commonwealth case discovered by the author reflected these classical views. If an accused were permitted to plead intoxication, it
3. Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard, 14 Crim. App. 159 (H.L.

1920); Annot., 12 A.L.R. 846 (1921); J. HI.ALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW

529-44

(2d ed. 1961).

(2d ed. 1960);

G. WILLIAMS,

CRIMINAL

LAW

559-64
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was stated, the door would be opened "for the practice of the greatest enormities with impunity." 4 This stringent moral aversion to
the defense survived its acceptance into the law, and finds echoes in
some of the later cases. 5 In fact, anti-liquor bias was probably one
of the forces responsible for the subsequent restriction and even
rolling-back of the defense once it had become established.
In any event, by 1819 intoxication had gained its first foothold
in English law, when evidence of intoxication was admitted in a
murder case as relevant to the question whether the act had been
premeditated, or done only in the "stress, heat, or impulse of the
moment."6 Interestingly, the defense had entered Pennsylvania
law in precisely the same circumstances twenty-five years earlier.
The court in Pennsylvania v. M'Fall clearly stated the conditions
under which the defense was permitted:
Drunkenness does not incapacitate a man for forming
a premeditated design of murder; but frequently suggests
it. A drunk man may certainly be guilty of murder. But
as drunkenness clouds the understanding and excites passion, it may be evidence of passion only, and of want of
malice and design ....

I

It is essential to an understanding of how intoxication came to be
a defense to a criminal charge to examine the factual situation in
M'Fall. The intoxicated defendant had been arguing with another
patron in a tavern and threatened to kill him. The patron left, and
the bartender ordered the defendant to leave because of his inebriated and quarrelsome condition. The defendant shook hands with
the bartender and left. Two minutes later the defendant attempted
to reenter the bar. The bartender tried to keep him outside, and in
the ensuing fist-fight the bartender was killed. The salient points
in this factual situation are these: the suddenness of the fight; absence of a deadly weapon; lack of (or great doubt about) the motive of the defendant and lack of opportunity for reflection, both
bearing on the question of premeditation; and the intoxicated and
quarrelsome condition of defendant. In other words, in M'Fall intoxication was simply evidence which, together with the other res
gestae, tended to negative the element of specific intent to take
life, the sine qua non of premeditated murder. Of course, if suc4. Respublica v. Weidle, 2 Dall. 88 (Pa. 1781).
5. Commonwealth v. Spega, 19 Beav. 11 (Pa. C.P. 1957); Commonwealth v. Trowbridge, 13 Beav. 251 (Pa. C.P. 1951); Commonwealth v.
Platt, 11 Phila. 415, 421 (Pa. C.P. 1876); Commonwealth v. Hart, 2 Brewst.
546 (Pa. 1868).
6. Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard, 14 Crim. App. 159 (H.L.
1920) ; Annot., 12 A.L.R. 846, 854 (1921).
7. Pennsylvania v. M'Fall, Add. 255 (Pa. 1794).

cessful, the defendant's evidence of intoxication could only prevent
the crime from rising to first-degree murder, leaving him guilty of
murder in the second degree. Since the evidence of intoxication
was offered in order to negative the element of premeditation, and
not as an affirmative defense, the burden of proof remained upon
the state.
Very likely the early appearance of the defense in Pennsylvania was facilitated by the division of murder into premeditated
and nonpremeditated murder by the legislature in 1794. Because it
distinguished the degrees of murder in terms of a "fully formed intent" to take life,8 the Act of 1794 perhaps brought into stronger
light the classical arbitrariness which simply excluded all evidence
of intoxication as a defense. As M'Fall demonstrates, in the original cases the question was not whether the accused had been capable of forming the intent to kill required in premeditated murder;
the question was rather whether he had in fact premeditated, 9 and
as intoxication was held to be evidence of passion, impulse, etc., it
was some evidence that he had not. It is fair to say that the debut
of intoxication as evidence for the defense in criminal cases did no
more than restore to intoxication its logically relevant place as
evidence negativing an asserted mental element. When this mental element (i.e., premeditation in the original cases) came to be
identified by statute as the distinguishing feature of a particular
crime, the then-conventional exclusion of evidence of intoxication
appeared more egregious, and was finally repudiated.
Had it not been for the interjection of another element into
the equation, there is no reason to suppose that the law would have
been greatly troubled by the intoxication defense. But, for better
or worse, it was not long until the simple terms on which the de8. Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9 (1868).
9. An actor who is found to have premeditated in fact is found by
necessary implication to have been capable of premeditation, but an actor
found to have been capable of forming a deliberate, willful, premeditated
intent may or may not in fact have formed it. This distinction has long

been recognized.

2 W.

TRICKETT, THE LAW OF CRIMES IN PENNSYLVANIA

735-39 (1908) [hereinafter cited as TRICKETT]. It is not an inconsequential
difference, particularly because the imposition of the burden of proof may
depend upon the distinction. Whether or not the distinction has been lost
sight of or abandoned is a recurring question throughout this paper.
Today, when reference is made to intoxication as negativing an element
of the offense, it is often unclear whether the "ordinary" or affirmative
branch of the defense is being referred to. Where capacity to form a criminal intent is the issue, it seems anomolous to refer to the defense as negativing an element of the offense. At least this formulation is not used in other
cases of asserted incapacity, such as insanity and infancy. Of course, if
the actor was unable to form an intent, that fact is inconsistent with conviction if proved, but a defense (as in infancy and insanity) based on incapacity seems to reach further than merely negativing an element in the
charge. It seems better to speak of intoxication as negativing the state's
case only where the ordinary branch of the defense is being followed (as
in M'Fall), i.e., where the defense does not rest upon an asserted incapacity
to form an intent, but rather where evidence of intoxication may make it
more likely that the defendant had not in fact formed the required intent.
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fense had originally been admitted were altered by the appearance
of the question of alcohol's effect upon the actor's ability to form a
specific intent. Once this question of capacity to form an intent
gained the spotlight, confusion set in, and to this day the law bears
the scars of the battle over and the retreaV from the position
that intoxication should be treated like insanity.
The question of capacity to form an intent began to replace
the question of whether an intent had in fact been formed, a process which got underway sometime before the Civil War. It is not
clear exactly how this came about, but an examination of the factual situations in which the defense came to be raised may provide
some clue. Evidence of intoxication continued to be offered, as it
was in M'Fall, in order to negative the asserted mental element of
premeditation in cases where the facts bore some similarity to those
in M'Fall, i.e., where there was no positive evidence of premeditation, no motive indicating premeditation, where the homicide occurred during a quick fight, etc.10 But in other cases, the res gestae
tended to indicate premeditation, as where there was evidence of
grudge, motive, extended altercation, opportunity to cool and to reflect, prior threats, use of a deadly weapon, etc. 1 Certainly in such
cases defendants could expect little benefit from a charge which
related the evidence of intoxication to the likelihood of a quick, passionate, or impulsive killing. The natural tendency of the defense
in such cases must have been to push for extension of the relevance
of the evidence of intoxication toward the insanity defense, to stress
the asserted lack of legal capacity of the defendant to form an intent, rather than to contend that he had not in fact conceived a
design to kill. While the exact provenance of the capacity issue remains problematic, the fact is that courts began to speak in terms
of capacity to form an intent, as well as in terms of whether or not
an intent had in fact been formed. Indeed the two different approaches to the defense soon became confused. 12 Some courts
seemed to recognize that the questions of capacity and intent were
distinct:
The true criterion as to the capability of the prisoner
to commit murder in the first degree is not whether he
was drunk or sober, but whether he had the power at the
time deliberately to form and plan in his mind the design

and intention of killing his victim. If he had such power
10. Keenan v. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. 55 (1862); Kelly v. Commonwealth, 1 Grant 484 (Pa. 1858); Commonwealth v. Hart, 2 Brewst. 546
(Pa. 1868); Commonwealth v. Perrier, 3 Phila. 229 (Pa. C.P. 1858).
11. Brooks v. Commonwealth, 61 Pa. 352 (1869); Warren v. Commonwealth, 37 Pa. 45 (1860); Kilpatrick v. Commonwealth, 31 Pa. 198 (1858).
12. TucKsnr at 735 et seq.

and did deliberate, plan and conceive the intention. . then
the crime would be murder in the first degree.13
Other courts thought that the issues were the same, regardless of
the purpose for which the evidence of intoxication was adduced:
To reduce the grade of the crime, therefore, where the
evidence on the part of the Commonwealth was such as
to make out a prima facie case of murder in the first degree, evidence showing want of deliberation, or, which is
the same thing, an incapacity
to deliberate, is of course
14
proper to be received.

Still other courts spoke of evidence of intoxication both in terms
of capacity and intent simultaneously, without apparent recognition that there was any distinction. 15
As the intoxication defense began to tend toward the insanity
defense, a sort of reaction to the extension of the defense appears
to have set in. This reaction took shape in the form of the imposition upon the defendant of the burden of proof of sufficient intoxication. 16 In some of these early cases, the burden appeared to continue to rest upon the state;' 7 in other cases it is not clear where
the burden lay.'8 But even before the Civil War, it came to be held
by some courts that the defendant had the burden of proof of intoxication by a preponderance of the evidence. 19 It seems only
natural that the burden of persuasion came to rest upon the defendant as the intoxication defense tended toward the affirmative
defense of insanity. Without stating their reasons, the early courts
placed another restriction upon the extension of the defense. It
was held that even where an actor's capacity to form a specific intent was in issue, so long as the asserted incapacity was caused by
intoxication, the defense could never be complete-it could only
succeed (in the case of homicide) in preventing the offense from
rising to the higher grade (of premeditated murder) .20 Doubtless
13. Commonwealth v. Perrier, 3 Phila. 229, 235 (Pa. C.P. 1858) (emphasis added).
14. Warren v. Commonwealth, 37 Pa. 45, 55 (1860) (emphasis added).
15. Kelly v. Commonwealth, 1 Grant 484 (Pa. 1858).
16. See TRICKETT at 740-41.
17. Commonwealth v. Woodley, 166 Pa. 463, 31 A. 202 (1895); Kelly v.
Commonwealth, 1 Grant 484 (1858); Commonwealth v. Perrier, 3 Phila. 229
(Pa. C.P. 1858); E. LEWiS, AN ABRIDGMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 406 (1848) (see note 20 infra).
18. Keenan v. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. 55 (1862); Kilpatrick v. Commonwealth, 31 Pa. 198 (1858); Commonwealth v. Crozier, 1 Brewst. 349 (Pa.
1867).
19. Warren v. Commonwealth, 37 Pa. 45 (1860); Commonwealth v.
Hart, 2 Brewst. 546 (Pa. 1868).
20. Brooks v. Commonwealth, 61 Pa. 352 (1869); Keenan v. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. 55 (1862); Kilpatrick v. Commonwealth, 31 Pa. 198 (1858).
Mania a potu (delirium tremens) was distinguished from other types of
"madness" caused by voluntary intoxication in terms of the legal effects of
the two defenses. Insanity in the former case was a complete defense,
whereas insanity in the latter was only a partial defense, reducing murder
from the first to the second degree, or preventing the murder from rising
to the first degree. The burden of proof was upon the defendant in regard
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this limitation seemed more natural because the same result was
reached where only intent, and not capacity was the issue, but it
was certainly not a logically imperative result, especially since the
defense of insanity was complete.?1 Perhaps the explanation is
that the courts considered the impaired capacity resulting from intoxication as lesser in degree than the total mental disability of the
insane. 22 Or perhaps it was simply that courts disapproved of the
manner in which the incapacity was arrived at, no matter how severe. Certainly all traces of antagonism to the defense had not
disappeared, 23 and some courts detected a drift toward total subjectivization of criminal responsibility if personal "susceptibilities"
were taken too much into account. 24 Finally, some courts seemed
to want to limit even those defenses based not upon the issue of
capacity, but only upon the issue of whether or not an intent had in
fact been formed. These courts apparently feared that if alcohol
were too closely associated with assertedly "passionate" or impulsive
killings, the next step would be to lower such killings to the level
of voluntary manslaughter. 25 In fact, this appears to have been the
result in some cases. 26 Unfortunately, while forestalling this possibility, evidence relevant to negativing premeditation seems also
27
to have been excluded.
Prior to the Civil War the law was, in general, shaking itself
to "settled" insanity (such as mania a potu) since it could result in
complete exoneration, but the defendant apparently did not have the burden in regard to the "partial" defense of voluntary intoxication resulting in
insanity (temporary, not settled). E. LEwis, AN ABRIDGMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 405-06 (1848).
21. See TRICKETT 738-39.
22. It seems to have been recognized at a fairly early date that there
exist some types of (complete) insanity which result from intoxication, such
as delirium tremens. Goersen v. Commonwealth, 106 Pa. 477 (1884); Commonwealth v. Crozier, 1 Brewst. 349 (Pa. 1867); E. LEWIS, AN ABRPDWMENT
OF THE CRIINAL LAw OF THE UNITED STATES 405 (1848); TRICKETT at 744
et seq., 1115-16. See also, Commonwealth v. Moore, 2 Pitts. Rep. 502 (Pa.
C.P. 1864). But beyond these "recognized" examples of alcoholic insanity,
the waters were uncharted, and the subsequent history of the defense of intoxication demonstrates the difficulty in drawing the line between legal insanity resulting from intoxication and lesser states of mental impairment.
This question is still not resolved (apparently) in modern law, and the continuing uncertainty about when intoxication may result in legal insanity
is another recurrent theme in this paper.
23. Commonwealth v. Platt, 11 Phila. 415, 421 (Pa. C.P. 1876); Commonwealth v. Hart, 2 Brewst. 546 (Pa. 1868).
24. Commonwealth v. McGowan, 189 Pa. 641, 42 A. 365 (1899); Keenan v. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. 55 (1862).
25. See TRICKETT at 744-45.
26. Commonwealth v. Baker, 11 Phila. 631 (Pa. C.P. 1876); Commonwealth v. Hart, 2 Brewst. 546 (Pa. 1868).
27. See Keenan v. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. 55 (1862).

out and trying to settle on the details of the intoxication defense.
The largest unresolved issue obviously was how far the defense of
intoxication could go when it was the actor's capacity to form an
intent which was in issue. Some courts used language similar to
that employed in the M'Naghten test when charging juries in terms
of capacity, 28 while other courts excluded relevant evidence tending to show states of alcoholic insanity. 29 The general rule seemed
to be that the insanity and intoxication defenses could merge completely only in cases of mania a potu (delirium tremens) .0 But of
course, that left unsettled the question of what the test should be in
cases where capacity was the issue, but mania a potu was not asserted. At this juncture the landmark case of Jones v. Commonwealth"' was decided, and for a short time it appeared that, although ordinary intoxication could never be a complete defense, the
test for mental capacity would be the same both in cases of insanity
and of intoxication.
In Jones v. Commonwealth the concept of an alcohol-impaired
incapacity to form a specific criminal intent seemed to blossom
into a broad, subjective test of criminal responsibility taking the
jury much further afield than it had yet been permitted to go.
After noting that the capability of determining a purpose, selecting
means of accomplishment, and being shrewd and watchful (which
it called "intelligence") was not the only criterion of premeditated
murder, and that, in any event a drunk was clearly capable of intelligence so defined, the court held that the distinguishing element of premeditated murder, the element toward which the intoxication defense was aimed, was another type of "capability."
Even when a drunk possesses intelligence, said the court:
[T]here may be an absence of the power to determine
properly the true nature and character of the act, its effect upon the subject, and the true responsibility of the
actor; a power necessary to control the impulses of the
mind and prevent the execution of the thought which possesses it. In other words, it is the absence of that self-determining power, which in a sane mind renders it conscious of the real nature of its own purposes, and capable of
resisting wrong impulses. When this self-governing power
is wanting, whether it is caused by insanity, gross intoxication, or other controlling influence, it cannot be said truthfully that the mind is fully conscious of its own purposes, and deliberates or premeditates in the sense of the
32
act describing murder in the first degree ....
If the language of Jones is related to the factual context of the case,
however, it is much less clear that the court intended to approach
28.
29.
30.
supra.
31.
32.

Commonwealth v. Hart, 2 Brewst. 546 (Pa. 1868).
Warren v. Commonwealth, 37 Pa. 45 (1860).
Commonwealth v. Crozier, 1 Brewst. 349 (Pa. 1867).
75 Pa. 403 (1874).
Id. at 408.

See note 22
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the insanity defense as closely as its words seem to indicate. The
defendant Jones had discovered his wife unfaithful, and in consequence of his failure to persuade her to return to his affections, he
attempted suicide with laudanum. He was found in time, and was
revived. But the effects lingered, the defendant took to heavy
drinking, and there was evidence that he had also ingested further
quantities of laudanum. There was a great deal of testimony that
the defendant had become insane through the combined influences
of despair, drugs, and alcohol. Nine days after his attempted suicide, the defendant sought out his estranged wife in the home of his
mother-in-law, with whom he had been on very good terms. As he
approached her to inquire about his wife, his mother-in-law threatened to throw a stool at him if he did not leave, whereupon the
defendant produced a pistol and shot the mother-in-law dead. Immediately after the killing the defendant expressed regret, saying
that he had intended to use the gun on his wife. These facts indicate, perhaps even more strongly than the facts in M'Fal, an unpremeditated, impulsive murder. It is not at all clear why the
court chose this opportunity to set up what amounted to an insanity test for the intoxication defense, especially since the result
in Jones was that the court simply reduced the grade of the murder to the second degree. Certainly this could have been accomplished without the unnecessary embellishment of a quasi-insanity
test; the facts clearly negatived the element of premeditation, leaving the state with only a case of second degree murder. Very
likely, the broad language of the court was intended only as a description of the defendant's state of mind, and not as an announcement of a new test for criminal responsibility where intoxication
was set up as a defense.
Whatever the court may have intended by its language in
Jones, defense attorneys were not slow in recognizing the apparent invitation to extend the intoxication defense to the very
grounds of the insanity defense. After Jones the intoxication defense tended more and more to be set up in cases where there was
abundant evidence of premeditation. 33 Obviously, in such cases
33. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 410 Pa. 605, 190 A.2d 146 (1963); Commonwealth v. Farrow, 382 Pa. 61, 114 A.2d 170 (1955); Commonwealth v.
Jones, 355 Pa. 522, 50 A.2d 317 (1947); Commonwealth v. McCausland, 348
Pa. 275, 35 A.2d 70 (1944); Commonwealth v. Kline, 341 Pa. 238, 19 A.2d
59 (1941); Commonwealth v. Iacobino, 319 Pa. 65, 178 A.2d 823 (1935);
Commonwealth v. Prescott, 284 Pa. 255, 131 A. 184 (1925); Commonwealth
v. Troy, 274 Pa. 265, 118 A. 252 (1922); Commonwealth v. Keeler, 242 Pa.
416, 89 A. 558 (1913); Commonwealth v. Detweiler, 229 Pa. 304, 78 A. 271
(1910); Commonwealth v. Fencez, 226 Pa. 114, 75 A. 19 (1910); Commonwealth v. Dudash, 204 Pa. 124, 53 A. 756 (1902); Commonwealth v. Cleary,

defendants could only hope to profit from the defense if the outward evidence of specific intent were overshadowed in juries' minds
by evidence of intoxication indicating a disabled, (nearly?) insane
mind. Jones was often cited, 4 in the years immediately succeeding, and "quasi-insanity" tests were applied to intoxication
35
defenses.
But other courts almost as immediately began to back away
from the broad language in Jones. On the one hand it was dis135 Pa. 64, 19 A. 1017 (1890); McClain v. Commonwealth, 110 Pa. 263, 1 A. 45
(1885); McGinnis v. Commonwealth, 102 Pa. 66 (1883); Nevling v. ComConsider, for example, the facts in Commonwealth, 98 Pa. 322 (1881).
monwealth v. Johnson. The intoxicated defendant got into a fight with the
decedent at a bar. The police intervened, and the defendant was sent to a
hospital for treatment of a laceration. At the hospital the defendant was
given a small quantity of pain killer. An hour or so later the accused told
another person that he would "get" the decedent for having "ganged" him.
Defendant sought out a gun shop, waited an hour for it to open, bought a
gun, and returned to the bar where he immediately shot and killed the decedent. The accused, contemplating his dying victim, expressed the wish
that the victim would die.
34. Commonwealth v. Woodley, 166 Pa. 463, 31 A. 202 (1895); Commonwealth v. Cleary, 135 Pa. 64, 19 A. 1017 (1890); Nevling v. Commonwealth, 98 Pa. 322 (1881); Commonwealth v. Senft, 12 Pa. D. & C. 735
(1929); Commonwealth v. Gentry, 5 Pa. Dist. 703 (1895); Commonwealth
v. Baker, 11 Phila. 631 (Pa. C.P. 1876); Commonwealth v. Platt, 11 Phila.
415, 421 (Pa. C.P. 1876).
35. The attempts of other courts to apply quasi-insanity tests after the
decision in Jones seem, in retrospect, to be an exercise in confusion. Some
courts at first appeared to hold that intoxication resulting in insanity (exclusive of delirium tremens) could provide a complete defense. Nevling v.
Commonwealth, 98 Pa. 322 (1881); Commonwealth v. Hart, 2 Brewst. 546
(Pa. 1868), perhaps if "idiocy" had resulted. Commonwealth v. Woodley,
166 Pa. 463 (1895); Goersen v. Commonwealth, 106 Pa. 477 (1884). Other
courts adhered to the view that only a reduction in the degree of the murder was possible (unless, apparently, delirium tremens had resulted).
Commonwealth v. Detweiler, 229 Pa. 304, 78 A. 271 (1910); Commonwealth
v. Eyler, 217 Pa. 512, 66 A. 747 (1907); Commonwealth v. Dudash, 204 Pa.
124, 53 A. 756 (1902); Commonwealth v. West, 204 Pa. 68, 53 A. 542 (1902);
Commonwealth v. McGowan, 189 Pa. 641, 42 A. 365 (1899); Commonwealth
v. McManus, 143 Pa. 64, 21 A. 1018 (1891); Commonwealth v. Cleary, 135 Pa.
64, 19 A. 1017 (1890); McGinnis v. Commonwealth, 102 Pa. 66 (1883). One
court held that only pre-existing insanity, coupled with intoxication could
provide a complete defense. Commonwealth v. Baker, 11 Phila. 631 (Pa.
C.P. 1876). Perhaps the apex of judicial despair over the question of the
legal effect of evidence of intoxication was reached in Commonwealth v.
Woodley, where the court candidly remarked that "perhaps" intoxication
which had "thoroughly unhinged" the defendant's mind would provide a
complete defense. The court simply left the entire question with the jury,
instructing them only that they should be guided by their opinion of the
extent of the defendant's intoxication. In general, the problem of intoxication as insanity was in a turbid state after Jones. See TRICKETT at 735-51.
Just as courts were uncertain of the objective of evidence of intoxication, so they were uncertain what sorts of evidence could be admitted, and
for what purposes. Evidence of a defendant's alcoholic history or his conduct when intoxicated, his family history of alcoholism, and even evidence
of how much the defendant had drunk and how he had acted were treated
differently, depending upon the court's view of the limits of the defense.
See TRICKETT at 741-44. Since there was no general agreement about the
legal effect of the defense itself, it is not surprising that there was no agreement on what types of evidence were admissible.

Intoxication as a Defense
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

tinguished and confined to its facts, 36 while on the other hand a

full-scale reaction to the equation of the legal effects of insanity
and intoxication set in. It was held that intoxication (at least in the
"normal" case) could amount at most to a sort of "partial" insanity,
not a complete defense, but only serving to reduce the grade of the
murder to the second degree.3 7 Courts continued to stress outward facts as solid evidence of premeditated purpose, 8 acts such as
assault with a deadly weapon, 9 the presence of pre-existing
grudges or other motives, 40 or prior threats. 4 1 A typical example
of the attitude which began to harden about the turn of the last
century is found in Commonwealth v. Snyder, where the court insisted that the defenses of intoxication and insanity must be kept
separate, not only because of the possibility of complete exoneration in the case of the former, but also because:
Were it otherwise, it would follow that in every case where
intoxication is set up, a necessary inquiry would be the
susceptibility of the party to intoxicating influence, and
the question of guilt would be made to depend upon pecularity of individual temperament as affected by drink.
The law knows no such doctrine; it does not divide men
into classes according to temperament or intellect judging
42
some more favorably than others....
While the courts were generally retreating from the effort being made to equate the tests for intoxication and insanity, there
also appeared to be an abandonment of attempts to adduce evidence
of intoxication as merely negativing the element of premeditation
(i.e., an abandonment of defenses not based on an asserted lack of
capacity to conceive a specific intent). Doubtless this resulted primarily from the recognition that the capacity approach had wider
application, including defendants whose acts otherwise indicated
all the elements of premeditation. Another factor may have been
that courts themselves continued to fear the possibility that if evi36. Commonwealth v. Detweiler, 229 Pa. 304, 78 A. 271 (1910); Nevling v. Commonwealth, 98 Pa. 322 (1881).
37. Commonwealth v. McMurray, 198 Pa. 51, 47 A. 952 (1901); Commonwealth v. Werling, 164 Pa. 559, 30 A. 406 (1894); Meyers v. Commonwealth, 83 Pa. 131 (1876).
38. TRICKETT at 740, 748-50.
39. Commonwealth v. Ingram, 440 Pa. 239, 270 A.2d 190 (1970); Commonwealth v. Jones, 355 Pa. 522, 50 A.2d 317 (1947); Commonwealth v.
lacobino, 319 Pa. 65, 178 A. 823 (1935); Commonwealth v. Lisowski, 274
Pa. 222, 117 A. 794 (1922); Commonwealth v. Boyd, 246 Pa. 529, 92 A. 705
(1914).
40. Commonwealth v. Gentry, 5 Pa. Dist. 703 (1895).
41. Commonwealth v. McMillan, 144 Pa. 610, 22 A. 1029 (1891); Nevling v. Commonwealth, 98 Pa. 322 (1881); Commonwealth v. Gentry, 5 Pa.
Dist. 703 (1895).
42. 224 Pa. 526, 530, 73 A. 910, 912 (1909).

dence of intoxication were offered as proof of passion, impulse, etc.,
there might be a tendency by juries to return verdicts of voluntary
manslaughter. 43 Certainly most of the factual contexts in which
the defense has been raised in this century indicate that evidence of
intoxication would have had practically no effect as tending to
negative the element of premeditation. But there are some cases
in which it appears that the better approach might have been to
avoid the issue of capacity, and to have concentrated on merely
negativing the state's case. 44 Today, courts 45 as well as commentators46 speak of the defense only as an affirmative one, with the
burden of persuasion upon the defendant. Commonwealth v. McMillan47 appears to be the last Pennsylvania appellate case on record where the distinction between evidence of intoxication offered
only to negative premeditation, as opposed to evidence offered to
prove incapacity to form a specific intent, was recognized.
In any event, well before the Second World War it could safely
have been said that the intoxication "charge" given in Jones was a
dead letter.45 From the various historical accretions to and subtractions from the theory that the legal test for intoxication-impaired capacity was the same as that for insanity has emerged the
present Pennsylvania law, which is, if nothing else, rather succinct considering the intricate history of the defense. In contemporary cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has said that although voluntary intoxication is neither an excuse nor an exonerat-ion,

intoxication which is so great as to make the accused incapable of forming a wilful, deliberate, and premeditated

design to kill, or incapable of judging his acts and their
consequences, may serve to reduce
49 the crime of murder
from the first to the second degree.
Certain corollary principles concerning the intoxication defense have emerged over the years. It is now well-established that
43. Commonwealth v. Ingram, 440 Pa. 239, 270 A.2d 190 (1970); Commonwealth v. Brown, 436 Pa. 423, 260 A.2d 742 (1970); Commonwealth v.
McGowan, 189 Pa. 641, 42 A. 365 (1899).
44. Commonwealth v. Brabham, 433 Pa. 491, 252 A.2d 378 (1969);
Commonwealth v. Brent, 233 Pa. 381, 82 A. 469 (1912).
See Commonwealth v. Ault, 10 Pa. Super. 651 (1899).
45. Commonwealth v. Iacobino, 319 Pa. 65, 178 A.2d 823 (1935).
The defense of insanity is an affirmative one and must be established by the defendant by "fairly preponderating evidence".
... Similarly, when the defense is intoxication, the burden is on
the defendant to establish that his intoxication was such as to prevent forming any intent....
Id. at 68, 825.
46. B. LAUB, PENNSYLVANIA TaIAL GUIDE, § 195 at 370-73 (1959);
LEVIN, LEVIN & LEVIN, SUMMARY OF PENNSYLVANIA

JURISPRUDENCE, CRIMINAL

LAw, §§ 60-63 at 62-64 (1955).

47. 144 Pa. 610, 22 A. 1029 (1891).
48. See Commonwealth v. Lehman, 309 Pa. 486, 164 A. 526 (1932);
Commonwealth v. Walker, 283 Pa. 468, 129 A. 453 (1925).
49. Commonwealth v. Brabham, 433 Pa. 491, 494, 252 A.2d 376, 378
(1969).
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intoxication is no defense to murder perpetrated during the commission of a felony."
Another principle is that although a defendant may not plead "diminished responsibility" in seeking to
reduce a criminal charge, evidence of intoxication offered for that
purpose is admissible, at the discretion of the court, on the question
of sentencing. 5 ' Finally, it has become settled that intoxication is
no defense to a criminal charge where it can be proved that the intent was formed before the actor became intoxicated, regardless of
the degree of intoxication existing at the moment the offense was
5
actually committed. '
The first non-homicide case in which a Pennsylvania appellate
court considered the defense of intoxication is apparently Commonwealth v. Ault.53 The decision in Ault reflects the confusion which
prevailed about the intoxication defense in the years during which
the retreat from Jones was in progress. The facts in Ault were that
the defendant, on his way out of church, removed some horse blankets, fur robes, and horse whips from his neighbors' conveyances,
put them in his own buggy, and drove home, apparently without
attempt at concealment. He was tried and convicted of larceny.
The defense was intoxication which prevented the defendant from
realizing that he had possession of other persons' property. The
defense tried to restrict the evidence to a rebuttal of the intent to
deprive (taking "with the mind of a thief"), but the trial court apparently would not permit this offer. Instead, the court seems to
50. Commonwealth v. Hardy, 423 Pa. 208, 223 A.2d 719 (1966); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 380 Pa. 52, 110 A.2d 216 (1954); Commonwealth v.
Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 862 (1949),
reh. denied, 338 U.S. 888 (1949); Commonwealth v. Brooks, 355 Pa. 551, 50
A.2d 325 (1947); Commonwealth v. Wooding, 355 Pa. 555, 50 A.2d 328
(1947); Commonwealth v. Aston, 26 Lanc. L. Rev. 322 (Pa. C.P. 1909).
But see Commonwealth v. Thompson, 381 Pa. 299, 113 A.2d 274 (1955).
The intoxication defense presents a special problem in cases of felony
murder. While it is settled that the intoxication of the defendant is irrelevant to the charge of (felony) murder, it remains relevant, at least logically, to the question of whether the defendant was capable of forming the
specific intent required in the felony charge, as, for example, in the case of
robbery. It is not clear whether Pennsylvania courts acknowledge the distinction. See Commonwealth v. Hardy and Commonwealth v. Thompson,
supra. See also B. LAUB, PENNSYLVANIA TRIAL GUIDE, § 195 at 372 n.24
(1959). At least some courts in other jurisdictions make a point of separating the relevant from the irrelevant purposes of the evidence of intoxication in such cases. People v. Koerber, 244 N.Y. 147, 155 N.E. 79 (1926).
51. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 381 Pa. 299, 113 A.2d 274 (1955);
Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353 (1949), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 862 (1949), reh. denied, 338 U.S. 888 (1949).
52. Commonwealth v. Farrow, 382 Pa. 61, 114 A.2d 170 (1955); Commonwealth v. McMurray, 198 Pa. 51, 47 A. 952 (1901); Nevling v. Commonwealth, 98 Pa. 322 (1881).
53. 10 Pa. Super. 651 (1899).

have forced upon the defendant an affirmative defense resting on
the contention that the defendant had been too drunk to have been
capable of forming an intent to steal. In affirming, the Pennsylvania Superior Court remarked:
The complaint is not that there was error in the statement
of the law, but that because defendant's counsel did not
in his address to the jury assert that drunkenness was an
excuse for crime, simply arguing that the defendant was so
drunk that he did not know that he had possession of the
stolen property, the charge of the court ought to have been
confined to the bearing of the evidence upon that one
fact. The evidence was before the jury for all purposes,
and it was not error for the court to instruct the jury as
to the effect of all the54 facts .

.

upon the question of the

guilt of the defendant.
The burden of proof was, of course, placed on the defendant. 55 The
decision in Ault seems almost antipodal to the decision in M'Fall,
since the defendant in the former was apparently forbidden to pursue the line of defense permitted in the latter. Perhaps the court
in Ault felt that a defense based on asserted unawareness of ownership went more to the question of capacity to form an intent to steal
than to the question of actual intent.
If the defense of intoxication got off to a rather ambiguous
start in non-homicide cases, things appear to have gotten no better,
at least if consistency is any criterion. The defense has been accepted in cases of assault with intent to ravish,5 6 robbery, 57 burglary,58 carrying a concealed weapon, 59 and criminal fraud.60
Some lower courts give an insanity charge in terms of the actor's
ability to distinguish right from wrong, 61 while other lower courts
simply won't allow the defense at all, even to specific intent crimes
such as robbery, 62 receiving,6 3 or obstructing an officer. 64 Intoxication is not a defense to assault and battery65 nor to voluntary
67
manslaughter6 6 in Pennsylvania.
54. Id. at 657.
55. He was convicted. Whether the defendant was prejudiced by
the line of defense he was apparently forced to pursue is problematic.
56. Commonwealth v. Heatter, 177 Pa. Super. 374, 111 A.2d 371 (1955).
57. Commonwealth v. Hart, 101 Pitts. L.J. 449 (Pa. C.P. 1953).
58. Commonwealth v. Bell, 189 Pa. Super. 389 (1959); Commonwealth
v. Silverman, 8 Bucks 238 (Pa. C.P. 1958).
59. Commonwealth v. Hart, 101 Pitts. L.J. 449 (Pa. C.P. 1953).
60. Commonwealth ex rel. Dunbar v. Keenan, 196 Pa. Super. 592, 176
A.2d 135 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 839 (1963).
61. Commonwealth v. Silverman, 8 Bucks 238 (Pa. C.P. 1958).
62. Commonwealth v. Trowbridge, 13 Beav. 251 (Pa. C.P. 1951).
63. Id.
64. Commonwealth v. Spega, 19 Beav. 11 (Pa. C.P. 1957).
65. Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1967) (dictum).
66. Commonwealth v. Ingram, 440 Pa. 239, 270 A.2d 190 (1970); Commonwealth v. Brown, 436 Pa. 423, 260 A.2d 742 (1970); Commonwealth
v. Reid, 432 Pa. 319, 247 A.2d 783 (1968); Commonwealth v. Walters, 431
Pa. 74, 244 A.2d 757 (1968).
67. While this article focuses on the history of the intoxication defense
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II.

ANALYSIS

OF THE DEFENSE IN PENNSYLVANIA

It has been observed in the preceding sketch of the history of
the intoxication defense in Pennsylvania that there appear to be
no contemporary appellate cases in which the defense was raised
only as an "ordinary" defense; that is, there are no cases like M'Fall
in which evidence of intoxication was presented simply for the purpose of negativing (other than by proving incapacity for forming an
intent) an element of the offense. In all of the twentieth-century
appellate cases the intoxication defense has apparently been addressed to the issue of whether or not the defendant had possessed
the capacity to form the required intent. The distinction between
the two different uses of evidence of intoxication is important for
several reasons. First, it seems a logically necessary conclusion
that a greater degree of intoxication is required in order to find that
a defendant was incapable of forming an intent than is required to
find that he had not in fact formed an intent.68 In the factual context of M'Fall,69 for example, evidence of the defendant's intoxication, along with the other data surrounding the homicide, lent some
credence to his contention that the killing was the unintended offspring of impulse and circumstance. M'Fall was probably capable
of forming an intent to kill; the question was, had he done so in
fact? If juries are always told, in every factual context, and in
every line of defense, that evidence of intoxication, to be of any
value to the accused, must be of such a degree that the defendant
was incapable of forming an intent, then the effect on the triers of
fact may be to obscure or nullify intoxication's evidentiary value
as tending to negative an element of the offense. Second, it is genin Pennsylvania, it does not appear that either the problems or the issues

have been different in other jurisdictions. Of course, the issues have not
been resolved uniformly. A few jurisdictions don't permit the defense at
all, while others have allowed it to extend further. Some of the same confusion apparent in the Pennsylvania law seems to have shrouded the progress of the defense everywhere. See, e.g., Annot., 12 A.LR. 846 (1921);
Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1236 (1966); A. HARNO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMI-

PROCEDURE 170-85 (4th ed. 1957); Note, Intoxication as a
Criminal Defense, 55 COL. L. REV. 1210 (1955).
68. Medical evidence seems to support the conclusion that only large
amounts of alcohol render a drinker unconscious of his activity. The effects
of ordinary intoxication not extreme in degree seem to be first a release
from inhibition, and second a dulling of perceptions. In a state of ordinary
intoxication the drinker often exhibits diminished self-control, outbursts of
passion, poor coordination, irresponsible behavior, and lack of will power.
Extreme intoxication, however, leads to states of stupor and unconsciousNAL LAW AND

ness like those of ether and chloroform amnesia. 1 CYCLOPEDIA OF MEDiCINE AND SURGERY 270-71 (1958); 3 R. GRAY, ATTORNEY'S TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE, ch. 59A at 59A-1 to 59A-7 (1971).

69.

See text following note 7 supra.

erally recognized that alcohol, even in moderate quantities, dulls
perception and reaction.7 0 What would appear to be sufficient
time or opportunity to deliberate in the case of a sober man may be
insufficient in the case of an inebriate. Intoxication in this context is relevant to the question whether the outward appearance
of events should not be modified by taking the defendant's condition into account, merely as evidence that (despite appearances) he
had not in fact formed an intent. In close cases, evidence of intoxication may raise a reasonable doubt. Third, in Pennsylvania, as in
many jurisdictions, when it is the defendant's capacity to form an
intent which is in issue, the defense becomes affirmative, 1 and the
burden of proof falls upon the accused. When capacity is really the
issue, this distribution of burdens does not seem unfair. 72 But
when evidence of intoxication is offered only to negative an element of the offense, then, of course, the burden should remain
upon the prosecution throughout.
The reason for the absence of modern appellate-level cases in
which evidence of intoxication was adduced only for the purpose of
negativing an element of the offense (i.e., as an ordinary defense)
is not clear. Cases in which the distinction was apparently recognized were not uncommon in the last century.7 3 Perhaps those
70. See note 68 supra.
71. Commonwealth v. Barnosky, 436 Pa. 59, 258 A.2d 512 (1969);
Commonwealth v. Chapman, 359 Pa. 164, 58 A.2d 433 (1948); Commonwealth v. Iacobino, 319 Pa. 65, 178 A. 823 (1935).
72. It is not clear whether, in light of the opinion in Commonwealth v.
Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 268 A.2d 89 (1970), the burden of proof of insanity still rests
upon the defendant in Pennsylvania. But see Commonwealth v. Zlatovich,
440 Pa. 388, 269 A.2d 469 (1970). Whatever change Vogel may have made in
the law, there is no a priori reason to suppose that it will be extended to
cases for voluntary intoxication where the defendant's capacity to form an
intent is in issue. In the first place, there is the factor of voluntariness. Unlike insane persons, inebriates (except possibly chronic alcoholics) have
some latitude of choice about the condition into which they put themselves.
Secondly, insanity, at least as contrasted with intoxication, is a "settled"
mental disease or defect, whereas intoxication (short of chronic alcoholism)
is only a "temporary" mental aberration. Third, insanity may be established either in terms of an actor's inability to know what he is doing, or in
terms of his inability to distinguish the wrongness of the act. The criteria of
sufficient intoxication, however, may be different, since the ability to distinguish right from wrong may be affected even at early stages of intoxication. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently held that the defenses of intoxication and insanity are distinct. Commonwealth v. Ingram,
440 Pa. 236, 270 A.2d 190 (1970). In Parts III and IV of this paper most of
the above distinctions will be discussed and rejected. Nonetheless, there
may be other strong arguments for refusing to remove the burden of proof
from the defendant in the intoxication defense. In the first place, an actor
who has rendered himself insane or unconscious of his acts through intoxication, whether from a "settled" condition or not, has reached his state of
irresponsibility by a clearly dissolute and antisocial path, a stigma by no
means identifiable with many insane defendants. Secondly, considering the
frequency of intoxication-related crimes and the possibility of fraud in the
defense, it may be well to keep the burden on the defendant. Finally, in
regard to the problem of proof or disproof, it seems more logical to have the
defendant prove intoxication than to require the state to prove sobriety.
73. See Commonwealth v. McMillan, 144 Pa. 610, 22 A. 1029 (1891);
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trials in which intoxication is used only as an ordinary defense
produce no problems worthy of appellate notice. Or perhaps defendants like M'Fall are no longer charged with first-degree murder. On the other hand, there is some evidence that the distinction
has been lost sight of. 74 If this is so, it is not surprising, considering the factual contexts in which the defense is usually raised in
contemporary cases. Where the outward facts strongly indicate
prepense, certainly the defense will be of little use if courts relate
the evidence of intoxication only to the likelihood that an act was
done impulsively, or in heat of passion, etc. The logical relevance
of intoxication, and the best line of defense in such situations,
would appear to lie in attempting to convince the jury that, notwithstanding his apparent conduct, from the time he formed his
intent to the time he acted, the defendant was too drunk to appreciate what he was doing. Since the vast majority of the modern
cases arise in such factual contexts,'7 perhaps defense lawyers as
well as courts have come to think of intoxication primarily as an
affirmative defense.
There is no way of ascertaining whether in fact a sort of single-mindedness has developed concerning the intoxication defense,
nor is there any way of determining whether some defendants
may be materially prejudiced by intoxication defenses based upon
asserted lack of capacity to form an intent. Yet there are some situations in which it appears that it might have been better for defendants to have avoided the affirmative branch of the defense, especially since it carries with it the burden of persuasion. In the
case of Commonwealth v. Ault76 it has been observed that the
defendant was apparently forced to take up the affirmative defense, even though he attempted to get the evidence before the jury
only to negative the element of specific intent in larceny (the intent to deprive indefinitely). In Ault the defendant contended that
he was unaware that he had taken property not his own. Perhaps
the defendant wished to say that he had mistaken the ownership,
or even that he simply took the property without any particular
Warren v. Commonwealth, 37 Pa. 45 (1860); Kelly v. Commonwealth, 1
Grant 484 (Pa. 1858); Pennsylvania v. M'Fall, Add. 255 (Pa. 1794); Commonwealth v. Ault, 10 Pa. Super. 651 (1899); Commonwealth v. Hart, 2
Brewst. 546 (Pa. 1868); Commonwealth v. Perrier, 3 Phila. 229 (Pa. C.P.
1858).
74. See notes 45, 46 and 54 supra and accompanying text. The distinction has been clearly made by Professor Williams, G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL
LAW 568-73 (2d ed. 1961), and by Professor Perkins, R. PERIUNS, CRIMINAL LAW 903 (1969).
75. See note 33 supra.
76. 10 Pa. Super. 651 (1899).

intent. Whatever the defense strategy, and however unlikely to
succeed, it does not appear that the court was justified in forcing
the defendant to take up an affirmative burden. Interestingly,
Ault seems to be the last Pennsylvania appellate case in which an
attempt was made (at least explicitly) to pursue the affirmative
branch of the defense. There have been cases since Ault in which
it appears that the affirmative defense might better have been
avoided. In Commonwealth v. Brent,77 for example, the defendant
got into a fight with the deceased while they were drinking. The
victim made some offensive remark, the defendant objected, they
quarrelled, and the defendant shot and killed the victim. There
was no evidence of pre-existing motive, grudge, or threat, and the
killing was "quick." The defendant requested an instruction that
the burden of proof of first-degree murder rested with the Commonwealth. This was refused by the trial court, and the jury was
instructed that the defendant had the burden of proof of sufficient
intoxication to render him incapable of forming a deliberate, premeditated intent to kill. The trial court's charge was upheld on
appeal. Again, it appears that a defendant was forced to resort to
an affirmative defense when an ordinary defense would have been
proper.
Another instance in which the ordinary branch of the defense
may be advisable is that in which mistake is asserted, or self-defense. For example, in Commonwealth v. Brabham78 the defendant urged both self-defense and intoxication as defenses. The question of whether there had in fact been a necessity for self-defense
was resolved against the defendant. Yet in such cases where both
self-defense and intoxication arise together, 79 it might be well to
plead only that the defendant mistook (because of intoxication) the
necessity of self-defense, not as an affirmative defense, but simply
as evidence negativing the element of premeditation. But in Brabham the evidence of intoxication was releated to the defendant's
capacity to form an intent. It seems to be well recognized that
other "affirmative" defenses, such as mistake, can also be used as
ordinary defenses, whereas the same duality appears to have escaped wide notice in the case of intoxication."0
77. 233 Pa. 381, 82 A. 469 (1912).
78. 433 Pa. 491, 252 A.2d 378 (1969).
79. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McGowan, 189 Pa. 641, 42 A. 365
(1899); Commonwealth v. Platt, 11 Phila. 415, 421 (Pa. C.P. 1876).
80. See, e.g., LEVIN, LEVIN, & LEVIN, SUMMARY OF PENNSYLVANIA
JURISPRUDENCE, CRIMINAL LAW, § 102 (1955):

Where the mistake of fact upon which is based a privilege is
not based upon reasonable grounds, the defendant may not assert
it as an absolute defense even though it be bona fide. It may nevertheless be a relevant factor, in reducing the grade of offense by
negating the element of malice.
Id. at 89. On the other hand, this distinction is not made in the section dealing with evidence of intoxication, which section appears, along with those
on infancy and insanity, under the rubric, Defenses Involving Incapacity to
Have Mens Rea. Id. at 55 et seq. See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 903
(1969).
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Turning to the affirmative side of the defense, the question immediately arises: What degree of intoxication is sufficient under
the modern rule to prove (by a preponderance of the evidence) that
the defendant was unable to form a design with deliberation and
premeditation, and to prove that he was incapable of judging properly the natural consequences of his acts? Further, how is such a
condition to be proved? The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has long
since abandoned the language in Jones v. Commonwealth," where,
in substance, an insanity test was given, and a sufficient degree of
intoxication was said to be one which rendered the defendant unconscious on the nature and character of his own purposes, and incapable of resisting wrong impulses. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has recently iterated the warning that the defenses of intoxication and insanity are separate.8 2 Whether this warning refers to
the legal results of the defenses (exoneration as opposed to "reduction" in grade of the offense), or to the evidential tests for criminal
responsibility is not clear.
There is some evidence indicating that modern Pennsylvania
courts have in view a defendant who is (was) totally unconscious
of his acts, a defendant whose volition has been completely cut off
from cognition. In the first place, Pennsylvania, like the majority
of jurisdictions, does not acknowledge the defense of diminished
responsibility in criminal cases. 83 It is unlikely that the courts
mean to make an exception in the case of inebriates, who are perhaps the least sympathetic class of defendants suffering from an
impaired or diminished capacity for conforming their conduct to
the law. Consequently, it appears that mere liberation from restraint, freedom from inhibition, and dulled awareness do not represent sufficient degrees of intoxication under the modern Pennsylvania rule. Second, until the modern rule had solidified into its
present form, courts used language which strongly indicates that
only defendants totally unconscious of their acts were envisioned as
coming within the ambit of the defense.8 4 Certainly in terms of
81. 75 Pa. 403 (1874). See text accompanying note 32 supra.
82. Commonwealth v. Ingram, 440 Pa. 239, 270 A.2d 190 (1970).
83. The concept of diminished responsibility seems to rest upon the
notion that acts are less culpable when the defendant acted with a "reduced" capacity to form a required criminal intent. See J. HALL & G.
MUELLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, 532-39 (2d ed. 1965).

84. Other verbal formulations of the sufficiency test are: intoxication
which "subverts conscious purpose," Commonwealth v. Farrow, 382 Pa.
61, 114 A.2d 170 (1955); Commonwealth v. Chapman, 359 Pa. 164, 58 A.2d
433 (1948); Commonwealth v. Kline, 341 Pa. 238, 19 A.2d 59 (1941). A
mind "no longer capable of acting consciously," Commonwealth v. McManus, 143 Pa. 64, 21 A. 1018 (1891). A mind "wholly unconscious" of its acts,
Meyers v. Commonwealth, 83 Pa. 131 (1876). A mind "thoroughly un-

the problem of proof of intoxication, the standard appears to
have been set very high. Consider, for example, the facts in Commonwealth v. Chapnan.85 There the defendant and many of his
blood relatives had long histories of alcoholism and insanity. The
defendant killed his wife of four months, with whom he appeared
to have been on good terms at least, after he had behaved in an altogether bizarre manner. There was no evidence of prepense in
the killing, even a good deal of evidence to the contrary. After
he had killed his wife, the defendant killed their pet dog, placed it
in one of his wife's arms, and passed out. He was ultimately discovered (a period of wakefulness intervening) unconscious on the
floor in the other arm of his lifeless wife. There was ample evidence that the defendant, immediately prior to the killing, had
ingested a large quantity of alcohol. Nonetheless, on appeal the
court upheld a conviction for first-degree murder (over two strong
dissents), stating that the evidence was insufficient to establish either lack of capacity to deliberate and premeditate, or inability
to judge the natural consequences of an act. What additional evidence would have sufficed is an interesting question. Parenthetically, it may be remarked that if total unconsciousness is the standard, then it is difficult to perceive what the distinctions are between
the test for insanity and the test for intoxication sufficient in degree to provide a defense.8 6
On the other side, there is also evidence that Pennsylvania
courts today do not mean unconsciousness when they charge juries
on the intoxication defense. In the first place, reference to the
word "consciousness" has been deleted from the modern rule, and
the modifier "properly" is sometimes used to qualify the criterion
of intoxication stated in terms of the defendant's power to judge
the consequences of his acts.

7

Second, the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court has recently held that "unconsciousness" may be a defense
only in cases of epilepsy, physical disabilities such as those resulting from blows on the head, and somnambulism. 8 Perhaps it can
be concluded only that it is not at all clear what state of mind, or
degree of intoxication, must be found by the trier of fact before the
defendant has carried his burden. The modern Pennsylvania rule
appears to be too vague and too general to furnish judges and juries with sufficient guidance when they consider evidence of intoxihinged," Commonwealth v. Woodley, 166 Pa. 463, 31 A. 202 (1895). "Unconscious of what he was doing," Nevling v. Commonwealth, 98 Pa. 322
(1881).
85. 359 Pa. 164, 58 A.2d 433 (1948).
86. Perhaps, since insanity may consist of the absence of the power to
distinguish the wrongness of an act, as well as unconsciousness of conduct,
the difference is that the intoxication defense includes only the latter criterion, although unconsciousness would certainly subsume an inability to
distinguish right from wrong.
87. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ingram, 440 Pa. 239, 270 A.2d 190
(1970).
88. Commonwealth v. Crosby,
Pa. ,279 A.2d 73 (1971).

Intoxication as a Defense
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

cation. That there is a certain element of danger in this lack of
specificity and direction was noted several decades ago:
The drunken man performs precisely the same acts that the
sober man does, but since murder has been divided into
degrees, the courts, instead of permitting the juries to decide on the facts as they exist, place upon them the impossible test of determining the mental state of the accused at
the time of committing the crime. .

.

. If he is under the

influence of alcohol, the court does not permit the jury to
decide on the facts

. . .

which show all the steps necessary

to constitute first-degree murder, but requires them to
speculate as to whether or not he had mentality enough
knowingly to do the acts which he did, with nothing to
guide them except evidence that he was intoxicated. It is
submitted that this speculation has no place in the law.
The unfortunate result of this is that juries are required to judge, not by the course of action and the results,
as in the case of other men, but by mere speculation as to
the possibilities of action of a drunken brain. This furnishes no sure guide, and in fact, in many cases, establishes
a different rule of liability for the drunken man than for
the sober one .... s9
It is, of course, purely argumentative whether the modern Pennsylvania law on intoxication as a defense has created a "special rule"
for intoxicated criminals, especially in light of cases like Chapman.
It is submitted that, whatever state of mind is currently envisioned by Pennsylvania courts as falling within the boundaries
of the modern rule on intoxication, where the defendant's capacity
to form a criminal intent is the issue, complete unconsciousness of
conduct should be the criterion in Pennsylvania. Only that degree of intoxication which so completely severs an actor's conduct
from his power to think, and leaves him beyond any possibility
of self-restraint and understanding should be sufficient to relieve
a defendant from any quota of criminal responsibility. A lesser
standard would amount to the creation of special rules for inebriates. In those jurisdictions which subscribe to the defense of diminished responsibility, there is something to be said for permitting an affirmative defense based on less than full insanity or complete unconsciousness of conduct. If other individual disabilities,
defects, susceptibilities, or pecularities are to be given relevance in
determining legal responsibility, measured by an actor's capacity
to form a criminal intent, then perhaps intoxication not amounting
89. Annot., 12 A.L.R. 846, 862-63, 883 (1921).

to unconsciousness of conduct should be a factor in the equation of
guilt. But where, as in Pennsylvania, the principle of diminished
responsibility is not acknowledged, it seems both unwise and unfair
to create a special rule for intoxicated offenders. Unfair because,
unlike congenital stupidity, simple ignorance, highly excitable temperament or deprived living conditons, there is a definite element
of voluntariness in the act of becoming intoxicated. Unwise because public discipline and morale would be adversely affected by
any solicitude shown for an excess often as antisocial in its effects
as it is frequent in recurrence. There does seem to be a real contest in modern law and jurisprudence between the advocates of
more subjective standards of mens rea (who apparently feel that
guilt is relative to individual mentality)9 0 and the advocates of more
objective standards of culpability (who stress the social necessity
of conformance to fixed standards).91 Wherever the truth may
lie, it does not seem good policy to confine or even begin the process
of allowing for diminished criminal responsibility with inebriates.
III.

CRITICISM

OF THE PRESENT LAW; THE

MODEL

PENAL CODE

One of the most persistent and articulate critics of the present
law on intoxication as a defense is Professor Jerome Hall, 92 who
has suggested that the issue in cases where the defense is raised
should be whether the defendant's prior experience with alcohol
should have alerted him to the possibility that he might commit a
criminal act while intoxicated. This conclusion follows both from
certain premises which Hall develops in the context of the criminal
law in general, as well as from some observations about the manner
in which contemporary courts actually treat the defense of intoxication.
First, Hall does not approve of the division of crimes into categories of specific and general intent because, he asserts, all crimes
require a positive criminal intent, and any criminal charge
(whether of a crime of general or specific intent) can be refuted by
See J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW (1960).
The principle of mens ea ... implies the personal guilt of normal adult offenders ....
[B]oth the offender's mens rea and his
motives must be considered in appraising his moral culpability....
Id. at 146.
91. See HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1-76 (1st ed. 1881).
If punishment stood on the moral grounds which are proposed for it, the first thing to be considered would be those limitations in the capacity for choosing rightly which arise from abnormal instincts, want of education, lack of intelligence, and all the
other defects which are most marked in the criminal classes. I
do not say that they should not be ....
I do not say that the criminal law does more good than harm. I only say that it is not enacted or administered on that theory.
Id. at 45.
92. See J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRTMINAL LAW 529-57 (2d ed.
1960) [hereinafter cited as HALL]; Hall, Intoxicationand Criminal Responsibility, 53 HARV. L. Rsv. 1045 (1944).
90.
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proving complete absence of criminal purpose.9 3 Whatever may be
the merits of this assertion, it remains true that some crimes (firstdegree murder, larceny, burglary, robbery, etc.) are so defined in
present law that an element of the offense is a specific purpose or
intent to accomplish the particular criminal result. In such cases,
the distinction between general and specific intent is important,
because where the evidence of intoxication is adduced, not to
prove lack of capacity, but only to negative in some other fashion
the element of specific intent, the defendant should be allowed to
proceed without the burden of an affirmative defense. In crimes
not requiring a specific intent, there being no element which evidence of intoxication can negative, 94 the defense must of necessity
become affirmative, and the defendant may not improperly be
given the burden of persuasion. This distinction may appear only
"technically persuasive," 95 but failure to observe it can result in
93. The merits of this argument are not only beyond the scope of this
paper, but also beyond the competence of the writer. It does appear, however, that Professor Hall's thesis derives most of its support from the relatively internal, or subjective standard which he sets up for mens rea.
Compare HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 39-76 (1st ed. 1881) with HALL 70212. Perhaps the distinction between crimes of general intent and crimes
of specific intent is that in the former, once the acts are proved, there arises
a presumption of criminal intent (where no "exceptional fact or excuse"
takes the acts out of the rule), as in murder, assault, rape, etc. HOLMES at
63. Looked at from the other side, some crimes may not be proved or
may not rise to a higher level, unless the acts are accompanied by a "particular state of feeling," as in first-degree murder or malicious mischief. Id.
loc. cit. Or perhaps, in the case of another class of crimes, such as larceny
and burglary, the element of specific intent is an "index to the external
event" which will probably happen. Id. at 72. It may be that Hall's thesis
disagrees with such views of the criminal act, or that it denies that they
were ever valid.
94. Evidence of intoxication could also be used in conjunction with
other evidence to show that an act was not criminal, but accidental (except,
of course, where negligence is sufficient to meet the culpability requirement)-to show that, in Holmes' phrase, the dog was not kicked but stumbled over. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (1st ed. 1881). See G. WILLIAMS,
CRIMINAL LAW 568-70 (2d ed. 1961). Williams also maintains that intoxication can be used to prove mistake (e.g., that the dog was kicked, but under a mistaken provocation). Whatever may be the case in Great Britain,
Pennsylvania apparently adheres to the view that mistake, to be an affirmative defense, must be both honest and reasonable in the case of general intent crimes. See LEVIN, LEVIN, & LEVIN, SUMMARY OF PENNSYLVANIA JURISPRUDENCE, CRIMINAL LAW, §§ 101-03 (1955); R. PERKINS, CRIMIConsequently, it is doubtful that, were the issue
NAL LAW 903 (1969).
raised, intoxication would be held relevant to prove mistake as an affirmative (complete) defense, since the objective standard of reasonableness is
not likely to include intoxication. If, as is apparently the case in England,
the only question were the reasonableness of the mistake from the (intoxicated) defendant's point of view, then perhaps intoxication would be admissible to prove mistake affirmatively.
95. HALL at 533.

prejudice to defendants, especially since the allocation of the burden of proof may, as in Pennsylvania, depend upon the observance.
Second, Hall derives his rule on the intoxication defense partly
from some observations about the manner in which the defense is
treated by modern courts. He notes the extreme difficulty in establishing a sufficient degree of intoxication to qualify under modern tests like Pennsylvania's. Courts appear uniformly adamant
against recognizing even severe states of intoxication as sufficiently
exculpatory.9 0 While Hall makes it plain that, when the actor's
capacity to form a criminal intent is in issue, he is concerned only
with extreme states of intoxication, he does not say whether or not
he has in mind complete unconsciousness of conduct:
What we have to deal with is not incapacity to perform
simple acts or such an obliteration of cognitive functions as
to exclude any degree of purposive conduct, but instead a
severe blunting of the capacity to understand the moral
quality of the act in issue, combined with a drastic lapse of
inhibition. As has been suggested, this closely resembles, if
it is not identical with, insanity. 97
Some of the conclusory language seems to indicate a state of unconsciousness, but the test proposed resembles the Jones test9" which
has been abandoned or rejected in Pennsylvania. If Hall's rule
envisions defendants whose states of intoxication had left them less
than completely unconscious of their acts, then it is submitted that,
where capacity to form an intent is the issue, the rule is not harmonious with Pennsylvania law, and for the reasons enumerated
above99 it should not be applied in Pennsylvania.
Although it is felt that Hall's rule on the intoxication defense
is not appropriate for Pennsylvania, he makes another point which
does apply to the law of the Commonwealth. Hall's rejection of the
distinction between general and specific intent has led him to the
conclusion that intoxication should be a defense to all crimes, except that when a defendant's prior experience forewarns him of
his dangerous condition when intoxicated, he may not assert the defense to a crime resting on criminal negligence. 10 0 It has been submitted that the distinction between general and specific intent
should be heeded in cases where a defendant does not base his defense upon asserted lack of capacity. However, when capacity is in
issue, and complete unconsciousness of conduct is the criterion of
sufficient intoxication, the defense should be available to all crimes
except those for which the act of intoxication itself is, for reasons
96. Id. at 541-44. Pennsylvania appears to fit Hall's general description. See the discussion of the Chapman case, at text following note 85
supra.
97. HALL at 554 (footnotes omitted).
98. See text accompanying note 32 supra.

99. See notes 90 and 91 supra and accompanying text.

100.

HALL

at 557.
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of public policy, made an element of the offense, 101 or where mere
negligence is the ratio of culpability. 102 Finally, in regard to Hall's
assertion that the determining factor in establishing responsibility for a criminal act committed while intoxicated should be the
defendant's personal experience with alcohol, it is submitted that
(cases of pathological intoxication aside) such a rule ignores the
common experience of everyone with the tendencies of inebriation.
It does not seem too great an imposition upon even minimal intelligence to hold everyone to a knowledge of the putative effects of
intoxication. 02 No doubt prior experience with alcohol has some
relevance to assessment of punishment, either as an aggravating or
as a mitigating factor, and in Pennsylvania evidence bearing on
10 4
the point seems clearly admissible for that purpose.
Another important formulation of the rule on intoxication as
101. As for example in the crime of driving while under the influence.
The boundary between intoxication as an offense and as a defense seems to
be one which can only be established as a matter of public policy. If intoxication were to be a defense to all crimes, then of course we would be left
with the paradox that intoxication could become a defense to drunken driving. Sometimes public policy seems to require that a "hard line" be taken,
as in cases of homicide by motor vehicle while intoxicated. In such
cases perhaps the proper inquiry should be whether or not the defendant
should have foreseen the possibility that his inebriation would lead to reckless conduct. See Edwards v. State, 202 Tenn. 393, 304 S.W.2d 500 (1957).
Such situations are not confined to homicides, assaults, and destruction of
property. An interesting Pennsylvania case is Pennsylvania v. Keffer,
Add. 290 (Pa. 1795), where the defendant was charged with contempt for
becoming intoxicated while serving as a grand juror. The court instructed
the jury that both the manner in which the defendant became inebriated
and his purpose (if any) in doing so were relevant, because it was held
essential to conviction that the defendant had permitted himself to become
intoxicated with the purpose of avoiding jury duty. Most of the discussion
concerning intoxication and recklessness is tangential to the principal issues in this paper, and despite the interesting questions it raises, it will be
avoided.
102. See Part IV for justification of this position.
103. See Paulsen, Intoxication as a Defense to Crime, 1961 U. ILL. L.
FORUM 1, 15 (1961) [hereinafter cited as PAULSEN].
On the other hand,
Judge Lewis apparently shared Professor Hall's views to some extent.
Commenting on the rule that intoxication is no excuse for crime, Judge
Lewis says:
This rule may seem harsh, when brought to bear upon an individual whose previous experience has furnished him with no actual knowledge of the destructive tendencies of such stimulus.
But there can be no hardship in its application to one whose frequent indulgence has rendered him familiar not only with its effect upon his own brain, but with its dangerous influence in respect to the lives of others ...
E. LEwIs, AN ABRIDGMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAw OF THE UNITED STATES 405
(1848).
104. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 381 Pa. 299, 113 A.2d 274 (1955);
Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353 (1949), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 862 (1949), reh. denied, 338 U.S. 888 (1949).

a defense which provides, by comparison, some perspective on the
modern Pennsylvania rule is that embodied in the Model Penal
Code prepared by the American Law Institute. The Code has provided the basis for several statutory restatements of the law on the
intoxication defense, including a bill which has been introduced in
the Pennsylvania legislature.10 5 The Code section 06 dealing with
the defense reads as follows:
Section 2.08. Intoxication.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (4) of this Section, intoxication of the actor is not a defense unless it
negatives an element of the offense.
(2) When recklessness establishes an element of the
offense, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is
unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had
he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial.
(3) Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute mental
disease within the meaning of Section 4.01.
(4) Intoxication which (a) is not self-induced or (b) is
pathological is an affirmative defense if by reason of such
intoxication the actor at the time of his conduct lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate its criminality
[wrongfulness] or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(5) Definitions. In this Section unless a different
meaning plainly is required:
(a) "intoxication" means a distrubance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the body;
(b) "self-induced intoxication" means intoxication caused by substances which the actor knowingly
introduces into his body, the tendency of which to
cause intoxication he knows or ought to know, unless
he introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under such circumstances as would afford a defense to
a charge of crime;
(c) "pathological intoxication" means intoxication grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of
the intoxicant, to which the actor does not know he is
susceptible.
The official comments to Section 2.08107 amplify the general language of the official draft provisions. From the comments it appears that the drafters envision Section 2.08(1) as including those
cases in which evidence of intoxication is addressed, not to the issue of capacity to form an intent, but simply to the purpose of
105. Senate Bill No. 455, Session of 1971 (printer's no. 470). The Code
has also provided the basis for suggested reform of federal criminal law, including the law on intoxication as a defense. 2 WORKING PAPERS OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 223, 225
(1970).
106. All references to Code sections are to the MODEL PENAL CODE PROPOSED OFFICIAL DRAFT (1962).
107. MODEL PENAL CODE TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 9, 1 (1959). All references to comments will be to "TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 9."
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negativing an element of the offense by other means.110 That is,
Section 2.08(1) is the means by which evidence of intoxication adduced under the ordinary branch of the defense is to reach the
10 9
jury.
Turning to the affirmative branch of the defense, where capacity is the basis of the defense, the Code does not directly describe that state or degree of intoxication sufficient to establish
lack of capacity under the Code. There is reason to believe, how1 10
ever, that unconsciousness of conduct is the implicit standard.
It is not clear why the drafters have gone no further in describing
of intoxication than in remarking that it is a
the required degree
"complex issue."'1 1 Perhaps it was considered advisable to leave
the resolution of the problem to each jurisdiction.
Whatever the criterion of sufficient intoxication under the
Code, it is clear that lack of capacity to form a criminal intent can
be a defense only to specific intent crimes. The Code does not use
the terms "specific" and "general" intent, but it achieves the same
dichotomy through the concepts of purpose, knowledge and recklessness. 112 As the comments to Section 2.08 make clear, intoxica108.

TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 9 at 7-9.

110.

See TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 9 at 4 n.4; PAULSEN at 7.

The first . . .question [is] whether intoxication ought to be
accorded a significance that is entirely co-extensive with its relevance to disprove purpose or knowledge, when they are the requisite mental elements of a specific crime. We submit that the answer clearly ought to be in the affirmative; that when the definition
of a crime or a degree thereof requires proof of such a state of mind,
the legal policy involved will almost certainly obtain whether or
not the absence of purpose or knowledge is due to the actor's selfinduced intoxication or to some other cause.
Id. at 7.
109. "Element of the offense" is defined in § 1.13. For unexplained reasons this section has been omitted from the Pennsylvania bill. Senate Bill
No. 455, Session of 1971 (printer's no. 470).
(Prof. Paulsen

was a special consultant on the Code's intoxication formulation).
111. TENTATIVE DRAFr No. 9 at 4.
112. Section 2.02 defines the general requirements of culpability, and
provides in part:
Section 2.02. General Requirements of Culpability.
(1) Minimum Requirements of Culpability. Except as provided in Section 2.05, a person is not guilty of an offense unless he
acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law
may require, with respect to each material element of the offense.
(2) Kinds of Culpability Defined.
(a) Purposely.
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of
an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct
or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances
or he believes or hopes that they exist.

tion resulting in incapacity to form a criminal intent will be a defense only to crimes requiring purpose or knowledge as an element
of offense, 113 that is, to specific intent crimes. This result is
reached because, say the drafters, general intent crimes rest fundamentally upon recklessness as the ratio of culpability, and the act of
becoming intoxicated may be equated with recklessness." 4 It is
suggested that the equation of "general intent" with recklessness
is questionable;' 15 or at least recklessness is only one type of general intent, and a type which leads to special problems of its own. 11 6
In any event, regardless of the accuracy of the equation of general
intent and recklessness, it will be argued in Part IV of this paper
that where complete unconsciousness of conduct is the standard of
intoxication and capacity to form a criminal intent is the issue, the
defense should also be available (at least to some extent) to crimes
of general intent. Under the Code, only cases of "settled" insanity1 7 resulting from intoxication will provide defenses to crimes
of general intent, and in such cases the defense will be co-extensive
with the insanity defense (i.e., it will be complete)."l 8
It is unclear from the Code whether the intoxication defense
will or will not be affirmative either in some or in all cases. Be(b) Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element
of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or
the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of
that nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is
aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause
such a result.
(c) Recklessly.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or
will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of
the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's
situation.
(d) Negligently.
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will
result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering
the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances
known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of
care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.
The word "intentionally" has replaced "purposely" in the Pennsylvania bill.
Senate Bill No. 455, Session of 1971 (printer's no. 470) at § 302.
113. TENTATvE DRAFT No. 9 at 2-9. See PAULSEN at 9.
114. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 9 at 8-9; PAULSEN at 13-15.
115.
116.
117.

See note 93 supra.
See note 101 supra.
Such as delirium tremens and alcoholic hallucinosis.
21-23; TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 9 at 9-10.
118. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 9 at 9; PAULSEN at 21-23.

PAULSEN

at
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cause the Code treats both the ordinary and the affirmative
branches of the defense under the same provision, there cannot,
of course, be any distinction between the two in terms of allocating
the burden of proof. Since pathological and involuntary intoxication are explicitly treated as affirmative defenses in Section 2.08(4),
there is an implication that the defense under Section 2.08(1) is not.
11 9
and Section 1.12 (treating affirmaFurther, the Code in general,
1 20
in particular, are heavily biased against giving
tive defenses)

119.

See comments to § 1.13, TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 4, 108-118

(now

§ 1.12).
120. Section 1.12 deals with affirmative defenses and provides as follows:
Section 1.12. Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt; Affirmative Defenses; Burden of Proving Fact When Not an Element of an Offense; Presumptions.
(1) No person may be convicted of an offense unless each
element of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In
the absence of such proof, the innocence of the defendant is assumed.
(2) Subsection (1) of this Section does not:
(a) require the disproof of an affirmative defense unless and until there is evidence supporting such defense; or
(b) apply to any defense which the Code or another
statute plainly requires the defendant to prove by a preponderance of evidence.
A ground of defense is affirmative, within the meaning
(3)
of Subsection (2) (a) of this Section, when:
(a) it arises under a section of the Code which so provides; or
(b) it relates to an offense defined by a statute other
than the Code and such statute so provides; or
it involves a matter of excuse or justification pe(c)
culiarly within the knowledge of the defendant on which he
can fairly be required to adduce supporting evidence.
When the application of the Code depends upon the find(4)
ing of a fact which is not an element of an offense, unless the Code
otherwise provides:
(a) the burden of proving the fact is on the prosecution or defendant, depending on whose interest or contention
will be furthered if the finding should be made; and
(b) the fact must be proved to the satisfaction of the
Court or jury, as the case may be.
When the Code establishes a presumption with respect
(5)
to any fact which is an element of an offense, it has the following
consequences:
(a) when there is evidence of the facts which give rise
to the presumption, the issue of the existence of the presumed
fact must be submitted to the jury, unless the Court is satisfied
that the evidence as a whole clearly negatives the presumed
fact; and
(b) when the issue of the existence of the presumed fact
is submitted to the jury, the Court shall charge that while the
presumed fact must, on all the evidence, be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, the law declares that the jury may regard
the facts giving rise to the presumption as sufficient evidence
of the presumed fact.
A presumption not established by the Code or inconsist(6)
ent with it has the consequences otherwise accorded it by law.
This section has been deleted in its entirety from the Pennsylvania bill.

defendants the burden of proof. The most that can be said is that,
unless the legislature otherwise provides, defendants probably
would not have the burden of proof under the Code. Removal of
the burden of proof from defendants certainly seems a desideratum
where the defense is not affirmative, but where capacity is the issue, Pennsylvania law clearly puts the onus on the accused, and it
has been suggested that there may be strong arguments for keeping it there.

12 1

IV.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary
The defense of intoxication entered Pennsylvania law, as it entered English law, under very limited circumstances. Evidence of
intoxication was adduced in order to negative the element of premeditation in first-degree murder, as tending to prove that the
homicide was the result of passion or impulse, that it was a "quick"
killing, partially (at least) inspired by intoxication. Before long,
however, the emphasis began to shift from the question whether a
specific intent to kill had in fact been formed to the question
whether the defendant had been capable of forming a specific intent at all. Once the issue of the defendant's capacity entered the
law, courts were in a quandary about how far the defense could extend. The last half of the nineteenth century saw various attempts to equate both the evidentiary test for capacity and the
legal result of the defense to the defense of insanity. While it apparently became established that some types of alcohol-related insanity (such as delirium tremens) could provide a complete defense,
short of these recognized cases of "settled" insanity, it has finally
come to be held that the two defenses are distinct, both in terms of
the tests for mental capacity and in terms of the legal results of the
defenses. It is now held that, even though the defense is only partial, it is still an affirmative defense, i.e. the defendant has the burden of proof of a sufficient degree of intoxication by a preponderance of the evidence.
The present century has seen the apparent abandonment of
attempts to use evidence of intoxication as an "ordinary" defense,
that is, as evidence merely tending to negative the state's case without raising the issue of capacity to form an intent. The factual contexts in which the defense is raised in contemporary cases may explain the disappearance of the "ordinary" branch of the defense,
since today the cases tend to abound with (outward) evidence of
premeditation. There is some indication, however, that a few defendants have been forced to take up the affirmative branch of the
defense (sometimes over objections) when the ordinary branch
No alternative section appears to have been substituted. Senate Bill No. 455,
Session of 1971 (printer's no. 470).
121. See note 72 supra.
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would have been proper. The modern Pennsylvania rule on intoxication as a defense is a hybrid, reflecting elements and principles evolved during the nascent stage of the affirmative branch of
the defense. The defense of intoxication is not available in Pennsylvania to crimes of general intent. But in crimes of specific intent,
the contemporary Pennsylvania rule is that, in the case of murder,
intoxication sufficient to deprive the mind of the power to form a
design with deliberation and premeditation, and to properly judge
the natural consequences of an act, may reduce the grade of the
murder to murder in the second degree. 1 22 In non-homicide specific intent crimes, the same test is applied, with appropriate modification, to the question whether the defendant had been incapable
of forming the particular (specific) intent required. The burden is
upon the defendant to establish a sufficient degree of intoxication
by a preponderance of the evidence.
There are no modern cases in which the issue of alcohol-related
insanity was raised, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently held that the defenses of intoxication and insanity are separate. There is no reason to suppose, however, that, at least in
cases of "settled" insanity produced by or related to alcohol (such
as delirium tremens), the long-established principle of giving the
full legal effect of the insanity defense would be repudiated if the
issue were raised. Short of recognized cases of "settled" insanity,
the defense of intoxication can only be partial, even though intoxication may have rendered the actor entirely unconscious of his own
acts, and completely incapable of self-restraint. It is not clear
whether a lesser degree of intoxication is sufficient to qualify for
the partial defense under the modem rule.
Criticisms of the present law on the intoxication defense center around two principal points. First, some critics feel that the restriction of the defense to specific intent crimes is unwarranted. It
is argued that the defense should be available to some general intent crimes, at least to those not resting upon criminal negligence,
and excepting those crimes for which the legislature has made the
act of becoming intoxicated an element of the offense. Second,
some critics contend that the defense should not be affirmative un122. The rule is generally stated in terms of lowering the murder to
murder in the second degree. But since the murder is presumed to be of the
second degree only, and the burden is upon the state to raise the degree, it
seems incorrect to speak of reducing it. Rather, it should be said that intoxication may prevent the homicide from rising to murder in the first degree. See Commonwealth v. Chapman, 359 Pa. 164, 58 A.2d 433 (1948) (dissenting opinion) (recognizing the distinction, at least where the defendant pleads guilty).

less specifically so designated by the legislature. Finally, critics
have also noted the reluctance of courts to recognize cases of alcohol-induced or alcohol-related insanity short of delirium tremens.
Conclusions
Turning first to the "ordinary" branch of the intoxication defense (i.e., to those cases where evidence of intoxication is introduced to negative an element of the offense without getting to the
question of the defendant's capacity to form an intent), it has been
observed that there appear to be no modern appellate cases in
which this branch of the defense was pursued. It is impossible to
say whether or not there are or have been defendants who were
materially prejudiced by failure to pursue the ordinary branch of
the defense, but there are some circumstances in which it would appear better strategy to avoid the affirmative side of the defense,
such as quick, impulsive or "passionate" killings where there is no
evidence of prior motive, etc.; cases in which intoxication-inspired
mistake is claimed, not as an affirmative defense but only as evidence negativing an asserted specific intent (as where mistaken necessity of self-defense, mistaken ownership, or mistaken consent is
asserted); cases in which intoxication may supply evidence of lack
of a specific criminal intent, as for example the intent-to deprive indefinitely or the intent to commit a felony in larceny and burglary.123 When the ordinary branch of the defense is being pursued, and the defendant is not contending that intoxication had deprived him of the power to form a specific intent, the defense is not
affirmative, and the defendant should not be forced to assume the
burden of proof. Nor is it necessary to establish the same degree
of intoxication required by the affirmative defense where the ordinary side of the defense is relied upon, because states of inebriation
not reaching unconsciousness may provide believable evidence of
impulse, passion, or mistake. Consequently the defendant should
not be forced to meet the more stringent criteria of sufficient intoxication imposed upon the affirmative defense, where lack of
capacity to form an intent is in issue. The ordinary side of the intoxication defense can be pursued only where the crime includes
an element of specific intent; it has no applicability to general intent crimes.
The affirmative side of the defense presents greater problems
than the ordinary side. The intoxication defense properly becomes
affirmative where the defendant asserts that intoxication had deprived him of the power to form a (specific) intent. This line of
defense is normally pursued where there is abundant outward
123.

See R. PERKINs,

SCIENCE AND

CRIMNAL LAW

903 (1969).

See also

ALCOHOL,

SOCiETY 148 (Yale Un. Press 1945), wherein Dr. Banay reports

on some of the stranger motivations of inebriated burglars and larcenists.
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evidence of all of the elements of the crime, including the intent
element, and the defendant can only hope to convince the jury
that, notwithstanding his conduct, he was unable to judge his acts
or appreciate what he was doing. The two principal issues which
arise in regard to the affirmative defense are the standard of intoxication sufficient to qualify under the affirmative rule, and
the question of whether the affirmative defense should extend
to general intent crimes.
It has been suggested that only that degree of intoxication
which renders the actor unconscious of his purposes and puts him
beyond the possibility of self-restraint through thought, judgment,
and reflection, not only in regard to the criminal act, but in regard
to everything he does, should be sufficient to establish an incapacity to form a criminal intent. 124 If a lesser standard were set at
a level where the actor retains some degree of control over his
conduct, then, in Pennsylvania at least, the result would be the
establishment of a "special rule" of liability for inebriates which
would discriminate against more sympathetic classes of defendants
laboring under impaired abilities to conform their conduct to the
law. 112 5 It may be that the "unconsciousness" standard is only coextensive with cases of alcohol-related insanity, or it may be more
extensive. Medical science appears to provide no ready answer.
But at least courts should be more willing to recognize that intoxication can result in insanity beyond delirium tremens. 12 6 In the
past, courts have tended to insist upon states of intoxication
amounting almost to physical immobility before the defendant
could carry his burden.1 27 Or they have inisted that intoxication,
to reach the level of insanity, must have produced a "settled" condition, as in delirium tremens.121 Both standards seem too harsh.
Non-inebriated insane defendants are not required to prove physical immobility, and it is difficult to see why the requirement should
be imposed in the case of inebriates. If by "settled," courts mean
that the insane condition must have had a respectably long history
in the defendant, then the requirement seems both medically unrealistic, and arbitrary. Some states of alcoholic insanity can be
124. See Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1236, 1263 et seq. (1966).
125. See notes 90 and 91 supra and accompanying text.
126. One popular legal-medical text has enumerated twelve separate
psychopathological states caused by alcohol, including hallucinosis, paranoia, brain atrophy, and deterioration of personality and of ethical sense
and judgment.

3 R.

GRAY,

ATTORNEY'S TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE

ch. 59A.40

at 59A-8 (1971).
127. HALL at 533; see Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1236, 1263 et seq. (1966).
128. PAULSEN at 21-23; R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 906 (1969); Annot.,
8 A.L.R.3d 1236, 1265-68 (1966).

reached after a single heavy drinking bout, without a life history
of alcoholism. 129 Certainly it is conceivable that an "ordinary"
drunk can become unconscious of his conduct without first qualifying as an alcoholic. Further, there seems to be no reason to reward "settled" cases of alcoholism with special treatment over the
"ordinary" drunk on a two-day spree. While the alcoholic may
have less control over his immediate drinking, he also has had more
opportunity, in his lucid moments, to turn himself in for treatment. 130 It is often said that the law will not litigate culpability
for the causes of "settled" insanity.1 31 It is difficult to understand
why the equable countenance of the law should darken when an
ordinary drunk tries to set up a defense of temporary alcoholic insanity, only to brighten again when an established alcoholic pleads
insanity resulting from prolonged dissipation. If voluntariness
in choosing to drink is the criterion, then (unless all alcoholics are
held to be insane compulsives from the time they take their first
drinks) the only difference between alcoholics and occasional drinkers is the remoteness of the "choice." Even in the case of alcoholics, the defense will succeed only if the defendant was "fortunate"
enough to have committed his crime during a seizure of recognized
medical standing. Otherwise his defense can only be partial, as in
the case of the ordinary drinker. Alcoholics and syphilitics with
long histories of dissolute conduct leading to insanity don't appear
to present a stronger case for legal tenderness than the "spree"
or occasional excessive drinker. Yet the latter type of offender
has been denied the affirmative insanity defense because his unconsciousness was only "temporary.' 32 Consequently, it is concluded that unconsciousness of conduct should be the standard, regardless of whether or not the resultant condition is distinguished
by having achieved medical recognition under some particular psychosis or syndrome, and regardless of whether or not the condition
had "settled" into the defendant over a period of time.
Perhaps the most difficult question of all in the intoxication
defense is whether or not it should be available to general intent
crimes. It is suggested that where complete unconsciousness of
129. See 3 R. GRAY, ATTORNEY'S TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE, ch. 59A at
59A-1 (1971); H. HAGGARD & E. JELLINEK, ALCOHOL EXPLORED 163 et seq.;
200 et seq. (1942).
130. Perkins, distinguishing drunkenness and insanity has said:
Logic alone might have indicated a different answer because
more fault is involved in long-continued overindulgence than in a
single debauch, but as it developed the "law takes no notice of the
cause of insanity."
Whereas, the law does notice
R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 906 (1969).
the cause of "drunkenness," no matter how severe. See Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d
1236, 1263-68 (1966).
131. See PAULSEN at 21; Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1236, 1265-68.
132. Id. A concise statement of the position was formulated by Judge
Lewis over a century ago. E. LEWIS, AN ABRIDGMENT OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 403-06 (1848).
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conduct is the criterion of intoxication, the affirmative defense
should be available, at least to some extent, to general intent
crimes. Obviously there is a conflict between the demands of public order and discipline '3 3 and the requirement of mens rea. 34 Vengeance or retribution, and the necessity of maintaining public order
require a "hard line" against alcohol-related crimes, particularly
because they recur so frequently, and because everyone should be
aware of the potential effects and tendencies of alcohol. On the
other hand it has long been recognized that there is a great deal of
arbitrariness in allowing the affirmative defense of intoxication
only in crimes of specific intent.1 5 If an actor has rendered himself completely unconscious of his conduct through intoxication,
and the defense is not allowed, then he is being punished, to a large
extent, for the act of becoming intoxicated. Since the law is solicitous of conditions of insanity produced by other types of reprehensible conduct, it seems unjustifiable to base liability upon the
actor's voluntary act of becoming intoxicated simply because his
"choice" was more proximate to the crime than the "choice" of the
alcoholic or syphilitic. 3 6 Finally, there does appear to be some
merit in the observation that cool, sober, deliberate criminal acts
compare pejoratively to acts performed by a defendant uncon133.

Mr. Justice Holmes wrote:
Public policy sacrifices the individual to the general good. It is
desirable that the burden of all should be equal, but it is still more
desirable to put an end to robbery and murder....

[Standards of conduct] are not only external ... but they are
of general application. They do not merely require that every man
should get as near as he can to the best conduct possible for him.
They require him at his own peril to come up to a certain height.
They take no account of incapacities, unless the weakness is so
marked as to fall into well-knowh exceptions, such as infancy or
madness.
THE COMMON LAW 48, 50 (1st ed. 1881).
134. Professor Hall has written:
What penal law now does to a large extent (and what it should
do throughout its total range) is to make liability depend upon the
actual state of the defendant's mind regarding the relevant facts.
HALL at 165.
135. Well over fifty years ago Dean Trickett remarked:
It is difficult, however, to perceive why, if the mind be so affected by alcoholic or other stimulants, as to be incapable of intending to kill, it may not also be incapable of intending great
bodily harm, or of realizing that the acts done may result in such
harm. The cases must be rare, indeed, in which a judge or a juror
can rationally say that while X was too drunk to intend the
death which his act, in the view of a sober man, would probably
cause, he was not too drunk to intend grave bodily harm, or to be
in that frame of mind known in the law of homicide as "malice."
2 W. TCKErT, THE LAw OF CRIMES TN PENNSYLVANIA 7-38-739 (1908).
136. Contra, PAULSEN at 4-5.

scious of his movements, and beyond self-restraint.
Jurisdictions have devised widely different solutions in balancing the requirements of public order and discipline against the requirement of mens rea. 137 In some jurisdictions intoxication can
never be a defense to any crime; 3 s in other jurisdictions it is a defense only to homicide. '1 9 In the majority, as in Pennsylvania, intoxication is a defense to all specific intent crimes. 14 0 In some
states the defense is restricted by legislative enactment,"' in others
it has been extended by the legislature. 42 And in some jurisdic1 43
tions intoxication is a defense to most general intent crimes.
Present Pennsylvania law takes a middle position between the
(relatively few) jurisdictions which deny the defense completely
and the (relatively few) jurisdictions which permit it to be raised
in many general intent crimes. But, it is submitted, the modern
Pennsylvania rule is too narrow because it refuses to recognize the
affirmative defense in general intent crimes (short of "settled" conditions of insanity), even where a state of unconsciousness rendered
the actor incapable of any conscious criminal intent, and even
though it permits the defense in specific intent crimes. Clearly the
distinction between specific and general intent is important in the
case of the ordinary branch of the defense, but once the affirmative
side of the defense is reached, the reason for the distinction disappears, and the defense should be available, to some extent, to all
defendants.
Perhaps the best solution is to acknowledge the requirement
of mens rea by permitting the defense to all crimes except those
resting upon criminal negligence, and except those in which by
legislative enactment intoxication is made either an element of
the offense or no defense. On the other hand, the demands of
public order and discipline should be recognized by setting the
standard of sufficient intoxication at the high level of unconsciousness of conduct. Relatively few cases appear to be involved and
the defendant will have the burden of proof by a preponderance. If history is any guide, the burden will be heavy,1 44 perhaps
137. One of the more interesting solutions seems to have evolved in
Monte Negro, where, it is reported, half the punishment was remitted when
the intoxicated person committed violence against a friend or stranger,
but the full sanction was applied when the violence was directed against an
enemy. H. HAGGARD & E. JELLINEK, ALCOHOL EXPLORED 122 (1942). This

unique approach seems to have disappeared along with the country which
fathered it.
138. See
139. See
140. See
141. See
ESSES 356-57

Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1236, 1240-46 (1966).
Chittum v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 12, 174 S.E.2d 779 (1970).
Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1236, 1246-63 (1966).
S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROC(1962); L. HALL & S. GLUECK, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW AND

ITS ENFORCEMENT

338 (2d ed. 1958); Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1236 (Supp. 1970).

142. See Commonwealth v. Ingram, 440 Pa. 239, 246 n.1, 270 A.2d 190,
193 n.6 (1970).
143. See G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 559-74 (2d ed. 1961).
144. See Commonwealth v. Chapman, 359 Pa. 164, 58 A.2d 433 (1948).
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too heavy, unless courts are more willing to recognize the likelihood of alcohol-related insanity when the facts suggest it. If, on
the other hand, it is felt desirable to continue to distinguish between "settled" cases of alcohol-induced insanity and "temporary"
conditions of unconsciousness, then perhaps the difference can
be acknowledged by creating an offense of "drunk and dangerous"'1 45 which would mitigate the full legal sanctions in cases of
"temporary" alcoholic insanity.

145.

See G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 573-74 (2d ed. 1961).

APPENDIX A
SELECTED PENNSYLVANIA CASES ON INTOXICATION
AS A DEFENSE TO A CRIMINAL CHARGE
I.

HOMICIDE CRIVIES

A. Murder
(1) The modern Pennsylvania rule on intoxication as a defense. Intoxication sufficient to deprive the mind of the power to
from a design with deliberation and premeditation, and to properly
judge the natural consequences of an act may reduce1 murder in
the first degree to murder in the second degree.
Commonwealth v. Mosley,
Pa. ,279 A.2d 174 (1971); Commonwealth v. Ingram, 440 Pa. 239, 270 A.2d 190 (1970); Commonwealth v. Barnosky, 436 Pa. 59, 258 A.2d 512 (1969); Commonwealth
v. Brabham, 433 Pa. 491, 252 A.2d 378 (1969); Commonwealth v. Mc-

Causland, 348 Pa. 275, 35 A.2d 70 (1944).
(2) The burden of proof of a sufficient degree of intoxication
is upon the defendant.
Commonwealth v. Barnosky, 436 Pa. 59, 258 A.2d 512 (1969);
Commonwealth v. Chapman, 359 Pa. 164, 58 A.2d 433 (1948); Commonwealth v. Jones, 355 Pa. 522, 50 A.2d 317 (1947); Commonwealth
v. Iacobino, 319 Pa. 65, 178 A. 823 (1935); Commonwealth v. Troy,
274 Pa. 304, 118 A. 252 (1922); Commonwealth v. Detweiler, 229 Pa.
304, 78 A. 271 (1910).
(3) The degree of the defendant's intoxication is a question of
fact, not a question of law.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 410 Pa. 605, 190 A.2d 146 (1963);
Commonwealth v. Jones, 355 Pa. 522, 50 A.2d 317 (1947).
(4) The intoxication of the defendant may be taken into account in assessing punishment, at the discretion of the court.
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 381 Pa. 299, 113 A.2d 274 (1955);
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 380 Pa. 52, 110 A.2d 216 (1954); Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353, cert. denied,
338 U.S. 862, reh. denied, 338 U.S. 888 (1949); Commonwealth v.
Brooks, 355 Pa. 551, 50 A.2d 325 (1947).
(5) Intoxication is no defense if the criminal intent was
formed before the defendant became intoxicated.
Commonwealth v. McMurray, 198 Pa. 51, 47 A. 952 (1901); Goersen v. Commonwealth, 106 Pa. 477 (1884); Nevling v. Commonwealth, 98 Pa. 322 (1881).
(6) Intoxication and insanity related2 or distinguished.
Commonwealth v. Ingram, 440 Pa. 236, 270 A.2d 190 (1970) (dis1. See note 122 main text supra.
2. The cases in which the defenses of insanity and intoxication are
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tinguished); Commonwealth v. Farrow, 382 Pa. 61, 114 A.2d 170
(1955) (contrasted); Commonwealth v. Iacobino, 319 Pa. 65, 178 A.
883 (1935) (compared as affirmative defenses); Commonwealth v.
Snyder, 224 Pa. 526, 73 A. 910 (1909) (distinguished); Commonwealth v. Woodley, 166 Pa. 463, 31 A. 202 (1895) (compared); Commonwealth v. Werling, 164 Pa. 559, 30 A. 406 (1894) (contrasted);
Goersen v. Commonwealth, 106 Pa. 477 (1884) (compared); Commonwealth v. Meyers, 83 Pa. 131 (1876) (contrasted); Jones v.
Commonwealth, 75 Pa. 403 (1874) (related) 3; Commonwealth v.
Baker, 11 Phila. 631 (Pa. C. P. 1876) (compared); Commonwealth
v. Platt, 11 Phila. 415, 421 (Pa. C. P. 1876) (distinguished); Commonwealth v. Hart, 2 Brewst. 546 (Pa. 1868) (related); Commonwealth v. Crozier, 1 Brewst. 349 (Pa. 1867); (mania a potu); Commonwealth v. Moore, 2 Pitts R. 502 (Pa. C. P. 1864) (mania a potu).
(7) Other murder cases in which intoxication was raised as a
defense.
Commonwealth v. Brown, 436 Pa. 423, 260 A.2d 742 (1970);
Commonwealth v. Kline, 341 Pa. 238, 19 A.2d 59 (1941); Commonwealth v. Lehman, 309 Pa. 486, 164 A. 526 (1932); Commonwealth
v. Prescott, 284 Pa. 255, 131 A. 184 (1925); Commonwealth v.
Walker, 283 Pa. 468, 129 A. 453 (1925); Commonwealth v. Lisowski,
274 Pa. 222, 117 A. 794 (1922); Commonwealth v. Boyd, 246 Pa. 529,
92 A. 705 (1914); Commonwealth v. Keeler, 242 Pa. 416, 89 A. 558
(1913); Commonwealth v. Brent, 233 Pa. 381, 82 A. 469 (1912);
Commonwealth v. Fencez, 226 Pa. 114, 75 A. 19 (1910); Commonwealth v. Nazarko, 224 Pa. 204, 73 A. 210 (1909); Commonwealth v.
Eyler, 217 Pa. 512, 66 A. 747 (1907); Commonwealth v. Dudash, 204
Pa. 124, 53 A. 756 (1902); Commonwealth v. West, 204 Pa. 68, 53
A. 542 (1902); Commonwealth v. McGowan, 189 Pa. 641, 42 A. 365
(1899); Commonwealth v. Cloonen, 151 Pa. 605, 25 A. 145 (1892);
Commonwealth v. McMillan, 144 Pa. 610, 22 A. 1029 (1891); Commonwealth v. McManus, 143 Pa. 64, 21 A. 1018 (1891); Commonwealth v. Cleary, 135 Pa. 64, 19 A. 1017 (1890) ; McClain v. Commonwealth 110 Pa. 263, 1 A. 45 (1885); McGinnis v. Commonwealth, 102
Pa. 66 (1883); Brooks v. Commonwealth, 61 Pa. 352 (1869); Keenan
v. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. 55 (1862); Warren v. Commonwealth, 37
Pa. 45 (1860); Kilpatrick v. Commonwealth, 31 Pa. 198 (1858); Kelly
held to merge or approach one another are of doubtful authority. See main
text.
3. Jones v. Commonwealth has been distinguished, confined to its
facts, and otherwise limited or even rejected (sub silentio). See Commonwealth v. Walker, 283 Pa. 468, 129 A. 453 (1925); Commonwealth v. Lehman, 309 Pa. 486, 164 A. 526 (1932); Commonwealth v. Detweiler, 229 Pa.
304, 78 A. 271 (1910); Nevling v. Commonwealth, 98 Pa. 322 (1881).

v. Commonwealth, 1 Grant 484
M'Fall, Add. 255 (Pa. 1794).
B.

(Pa. 1858); Pennsylvania v.

Felony Murder

Intoxication is not a defense to homicide committed dur4
ing the perpetrationof a felony.
Commonwealth v. Hardy, 423 Pa. 208, 223 A.2d 719 (1966); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 380 Pa. 52, 110 A.2d 216 (1954); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 367 Pa. 102, 79 A.2d 401 (1951); Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353, cert. denied, 338
U.S. 862, reh. denied, 338 U.S. 888 (1949); Commonwealth v.
Brooks, 355 Pa. 551, 50 A.2d 325 (1947); Commonwealth v. Wooding,
355 Pa. 555, 50 A.2d 328 (1947); United States ex Tel. Rucker v. Myers, 311 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 844 (1963) (interpreting Pennsylvania law).
C.

Voluntary Manslaughter

Intoxicationis not a defense to voluntary manslaughter.
Commonwealth v. Ingram, 440 Pa. 236, 270 A.2d 190 (1970);
Commonwealth v. Brown, 436 Pa. 423, 260 A.2d 742 (1970); Commonwealth v. Reid, 432 Pa. 319, 247 A.2d 783 (1968); Commonwealth
v. Walters, 431 Pa. 74, 244 A.2d 757 (1968).

II. NON-HOMICIDE CRIMES
A. Assault and Battery
Intoxication is not a defense to simple assault and battery.
Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1967)

(dic-

tum).
B.

Burglary
Intoxicationis a defense to burglary.
Commonwealth v. Bell, 189 Pa. Super. 389, 150 A.2d 174 (1959);
Commonwealth v. Silverman, 8 Bucks 238 (Pa. C.P. 1958).
C.

Carrying a Concealed Weapon.
Intoxication is a defense to a charge of carrying a concealed weapon.
Commonwealth v. Hart, 101 Pitts. L.J. 449 (Pa. C.P. 1953).
D.

Criminal Fraud

Intoxication is a defense to a charge of criminal fraud.
Commonwealth ex rel. Dunbar v. Keenan, 196 Pa. Super. 592
(1962), 176 A.2d 135, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 839 (1963).
4. But see Commonwealth v. Thompson, 381 Pa. 299, 113 A.2d 274
(1955), where the defense was apparently allowed despite the fact that the
murder was committed during (an attempted?) rape.
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E. Larceny
Intoxication is a defense to larceny.
Commonwealth v. Ault, 10 Pa. Super. 651 (1899).
F. Obstructing an Officer
Intoxication has been held not to be a defense to a charge
of obstructing an officer.5
Commonwealth v. Spega, 19 Beav. 11 (Pa. C.P. 1957).
G. Receiving
Intoxication has been held not to be a defense to a charge
of receiving stolen goods.,
Commonwealth v. Trowbridge, 13 Beav. 251 (Pa. C.P. 1951).
H. Robbery
7
Intoxication is a defense t o robbery.
Commonwealth v. Hart, 101 Pitts. L.J. 449 (Pa. C.P. 1953). See
also Commonwealth v. Hardy, 423 Pa. 208, 223 A.2d 719 (1966);
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 367 Pa. 102, 79 A.2d 401 (1951).

I.

Other crimes

Commonwealth v. Heatter, 177 Pa. Super. 374, 111 A.2d 371
(1955) (held a defense to assault with intent to ravish); Respublica
v. Weidle, 2 Dall. 88 (Pa. 1781) (held not a defense to "misprision of
treason").

III.
A.

EVIDENCE OF INTOXICATION

Duty to Reveal

Failure to reveal evidence of intoxication is an unlawful
suppression by the state, and is grounds for habeas corpus and a
new trial.
United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir.),

cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955) (interpreting Pennsylvania law).
5. This case appears to be incorrectly decided since the statutory
offense requires a specific intent to obstruct.
6. This case appears to be incorrectly decided since receiving requires
a specific intent (i.e., receiving with a fraudulent purpose).
7. Contra, Commonwealth v. Trowbridge, 13 Beav. 251 (Pa. C.P.
1951). Hart would appear to be correct, and Trowbridge incorrect, since
robbery is a specific intent crime.

APPENDIX B
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
These model instructions have been written for those cases in
which the defense of intoxication is truly affirmative, i.e., for those
cases in which the defendant contends that he was so intoxicated
that he was unable to form a specific criminal intent. Where evidence of intoxication is introduced, along with other evidence,
only for the purpose of negativing an asserted specific intent, and
the defense is not founded on an alleged incapacity to form a specific intent, the defense is not properly affirmative in nature, and
no special instruction is required. The instructions are based
strictly on current Pennsylvania law and cases; they are written
for specific intent crimes, but the formulas could easily be adapted
to general intent crimes if, as advocated in the main text, the intoxication defense were made available to some general intent crimes.
I.

HOMICIDE

1

(A) Murder. The defendant is charged with murder in the
first degree. Murder in the first degree requires the formation of a
wilful, deliberate, premeditated design to kill. The defense has introduced evidence that defendant, at the time of the killing, was intoxicated from the use of (alcoholic beverages). The defense contends that defendant's state of intoxication was such that defendant was unable to have or to form the required specific intent to
wilfully, deliberately, and premeditatedly kill the deceased. There
is no contention that defendant was or became intoxicated involuntarily. That is, the defendant in this case was or became intoxicated, if he was so intoxicated, by his own free will.
In general, voluntary intoxication is neither an excuse for nor
a defense to a criminal charge, and it will not relieve a defendant
from responsibility for crime. However, voluntary intoxication
may be a defense to murder in the first degree, a crime which requires the specific intent to kill. Voluntary intoxication may reduce the crime of murder to murder in the second degree only,2 a
crime which does not require a specific intent to kill. Thus while
the crime remains murder, your task is to decide whether, if you
find defendant guilty of murder, it is murder in the first degree or
murder in the second degree. If you find the defendant guilty of
murder, you should find him guilty of murder in the second degree if you believe from a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was so intoxicated that he was incapable of having or form1. This instruction is based on the cases cited in Appendix A at I.a (1).
See also B. LAUB, PENNSYLVANIA TRIAL GUIDE, § 195 at 370 (1959).
2. See note 122 main text supra.
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ing the specific intent to kill. That is, you should find the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree if you find that intoxication had so clouded his mind as to deprive the defendant of his
power of deliberation and premeditation, making him incapable of
forming a wilful, deliberate, and premeditated design to kill, and
making him incapable of judging properly his acts and their consequences.
I remind you that while the state has the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the murder charged, defendant has the burden of proving that such a degree of intoxication existed, and that the defendant need prove this
only by a preponderance of the evidence. 3 Otherwise stated, if
you find that the defendant committed the murder charged, and if
you believe that the evidence makes it more likely than not 4 that
the defendant's degree of intoxication was as great as he contends,
then defendant has carried his burden of proof, and you should find
him guilty of murder in the second degree. Otherwise you should
find defendant guilty of murder in the first degree.5
(B) Felony murder.6 The defendant is charged with a murin which he
der which occured during a (robbery) (burglary) (-)
was an alleged participant. A murder perpetrated during the comis murder in the first demission of a (robbery) (burglary) (-)
gree, irrespective of the intention or design of the killers. The defense has introduced evidence that the defendant was intoxicated at
the time of the killing. The intoxication of the defendant, even if
proved to your satisfaction, has no bearing upon the charge of murder. The question of intoxication is irrelevant to the charge of murder. If you find that the defendant was engaged in committing the
and that the murder occurred
crime of (robbery) (burglary) (-),
during the commission of such crime, then the defendant is guilty
of murder in the first degree, regardless of the intent of the perpetrators, and regardless of defendant's degree of intoxication. The
defendant's alleged intoxication is relevant only to the question of
the intent to commit the crime of (robbery) (burglary) (-).7
3. See cases cited in Appendix A at I.a(2).

4. See SeLing Hoisery, Inc. v. Margulies, 364 Pa. 45, 70 A.2d 854

(1950) for this alternative formulation of the meaning of "by a preponder-

ance of the evidence."
5. Intoxication, even when not sufficient to constitute an affirmative
defense to crime, may be a relevant consideration in sentencing. See Appendix A at I.a (4).
6. This instruction is based on the cases cited in Appendix A at I.B.

See also, B.
7.

LAUB, PENNSYLVANIA TRIAL GUIDE, §

See note 50 main text supra.

195 at 371-72 (1959).

lI.

FELONIES OTHER THAN MURDER

8

The defendant is charged with (robbery) (burglary) (larceny)
(-).
In the crime of (robbery), (etc.) it is necessary that, in addition to the intended act which characterizes the offense, the act
must be accompanied by a specific or particular intent without
which such a crime cannot be committed. That is, in the crime of
(robbery) (etc.), a necessary element is the existence in the mind
of the perpetrator of the specific intent to (take from the person or
immediate presence of another, against his will, and by means of
force and fear) (etc.), and unless such intent exists the crime of
(robbery) (etc.) is not committed.
The defense has introduced evidence that, at the time of the alleged (robbery) (etc.), the defendant was intoxicated from the use of
(alcoholic beverages). Although intoxication or drunkenness alone
will never excuse the commission of a (robbery) (etc.), the fact that
a defendant may have been intoxicated at the time of the (robbery)
(etc.) may negate the existence of a specific intent to commit that
crime. Thus, evidence that a defendant acted or failed to act while
in a state of intoxication is to be considered in determining whether
or not the defendant acted, or failed to act, with the required specific intent to commit (robbery) (etc.), as charged. If you believe
that the defendant was so intoxicated at the time of the alleged
(robbery) (etc.) that he could not have or form the specific intent
to commit the offense, you should acquit the defendant. If you believe that the defendant was not intoxicated to such an extent, intoxication is no defense, and you should find the defendant guilty.
I remind you that while the state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the (robbery) (etc.) charged, the defendant has the burden of proving that
such a degree of intoxication existed, and that the defendant need
prove this only by a preponderance of the evidence. Otherwise
stated, if you believe that the evidence makes it more likely than
not that the defendant's degree of intoxication was so great that
he could not have or form the required specific intent to commit
(robbery) (etc.), then defendant has carried his burden of proof, and
you should find him not guilty. Otherwise you should find the defendant guilty.

8. This instruction is based on the cases cited in Appendix A at II.B,
II.E., II.H, and II.I, as well as upon 1 DEVITT & BLAcKi--", FEDERAL JURY
PRAcTI cE AND INSTRUCTIONS (1970), and 1 CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS
(1958).
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